

Like father, like son, like mother, like daughter: Intergenerational transmission of intrahousehold gender attitudes in Ethiopia*

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Abstract

This paper draws on a novel large-scale dataset from rural Ethiopia to analyze the intergenerational transmission of male dominance in decision-making. More specifically, I analyze whether male dominance in decision-making, male engagement in household tasks and intimate partner violence in currently formed marital households is correlated with the patterns of male dominance reported in the natal households of both the husband and wife, an analysis conducted for the first time in a developing country context. The empirical results suggest that patterns of male dominance have shifted rapidly in a single generation, and there is very little evidence of any intergenerational transmission. More specifically, the estimated relationships between male dominance in the natal and marital households are varying in sign and statistically insignificant. I present further evidence that this pattern may reflect a very weak intrahousehold correlation in gender attitudes between husband and wife: male dominance in the natal household is predictive of individual gender attitudes, but gender attitudes are on average not similar comparing across spouses.

1 Introduction

A large literature primarily in psychology and sociology has established that patterns in spousal relationships, including intimate partner violence, can be transmitted from

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parents to children, and accordingly adults who were exposed to certain intrahousehold dynamics in childhood face an increased probability of replicating those dynamics in their own relationships later in life. However, this literature is primarily drawn from developed countries where detailed longitudinal data around intrafamilial relationships is more commonly available. Evidence from the United States, for example, suggests that intergenerational transmission of gender attitudes has been significant over the last fifty years, a period of rapid shifts in women’s roles and status (Moen et al., 1997; Min et al., 2012; Liefbroer and Elzinga, 2012).

In developing countries, by contrast, much less is known about how broader patterns of male dominance in decision-making, in addition to the explicit use of violence, are reproduced across generations. Gender gaps favoring men in the developing world are dramatic, persistent, and seemingly undergirded by deeply rooted attitudes (Jayachandran, 2015). Accordingly, understanding whether and how these gender-discriminatory norms and practices transmit across generations is important both for a deeper understanding of women’s welfare and because of the substantial economic consequences of these norms (Duflo, 2012). Given the evidence from the developed world, it is plausible to hypothesize that the cross-generational correlation in gender attitudes will be strong even in developing country contexts characterized by rapid social transformation.

This paper draws on a novel large-scale dataset from rural Ethiopia to describe the intergenerational transmission of male dominance in decision-making, seeking to analyze two relatively simple questions for the first time. First, is the pattern of male dominance in decision-making observed in currently formed marital households, as well as male engagement in household work, correlated with the pattern of male dominance in decision-making reported in the husband’s or wife’s natal household? Second, is the pattern of intimate partner violence (IPV) in the marital household correlated with male dominance in the natal households? In addition, the analysis draws on reports of male dominance and engagement provided by both spouses, enabling an additional analysis of the concordance of spousal relationship patterns as perceived by the husband and wife.

Using a sample of 11,835 individuals (5945 men and 5890 women) surveyed in four rural districts in Ethiopia in 2017, I present some novel stylized facts. First, patterns of male dominance in household decision-making in this context have shifted rapidly in a single generation: current adult respondents, both male and female, generally state that their own fathers dominated decision-making in their natal households, but report a much more heterogeneous pattern of male dominance in decision-making in their current, marital households. Interestingly, as these patterns shift, it seems that decision-making is not necessarily perceived to be consistent comparing across husband and wife. When contemporaneous reports of male dominance in decision-making in the same households

provided by the husband and wife separately are matched, only between 30% and 40% of spousal pairs report agreement.

Second, there is very little evidence of any intergenerational transmission of male dominance in decision-making. In other words, men and women who report their natal households were characterized by (atypically) more equitable patterns of decision-making do not exhibit more equitable patterns of decision-making or reduced levels of IPV in their own marital households. This pattern is consistent across domains of decision-making and male engagement; it is consistent when examining transmission from either the husband's or wife's natal household; and it is consistent when examining decision-making reported by either the husband or the wife. Similarly, in a context characterized by generally high levels of IPV (nearly 60% of women report experience of emotional violence in the last year, and over 40% report experience of physical and/or sexual violence), there is no evidence of intergenerational transmission between patterns of decision-making in the natal household and current reported IPV in the marital household.

To sum up, this paper provides the first evidence of the dependence across generations of gender dynamics within marriages in a developing country context. The findings suggest there is little intergenerational persistence in intrahousehold decision-making patterns. Similarly, gender dynamics in the natal household do not predict patterns of intimate partner violence in the marital household. These results stand in contrast to the literature from the developed world, and suggest that the intergenerational reproduction of attitudes in Ethiopia has followed a very different pattern.

This evidence adds to an extremely limited literature around intergenerational transmission of intrahousehold attitudes and behaviors in developing countries. There is a large literature around intergenerational transmission of intimate partner violence in psychology and sociology, generally concluding that individuals exposed to violence as children have a moderately higher risk of engagement in a violent relationship (as perpetrator or victim) as adults; a useful meta-analysis is provided in Stith et al. (2000). However, the majority of this literature analyzes data from developed countries, primarily the U.S. There is more limited evidence from developing countries, including Nicaragua (Ellsberg et al., 1999), Haiti (Gage, 2005), India (Burton et al., 2000), South Africa (Abrahams and Jewkes, 2005; Gass et al., 2011), Thailand (Kerley et al., 2010), Bangladesh (Islam et al., 2014), and Burundi (Crombach and Bambonyé, 2015).

Similarly, there is a large literature analyzing intergenerational transmission of marriage and family norms, gender norms, and marriage and partnering practices (broadly defined) in the U.S. and other developed countries; relevant recent papers include Cunningham (2001), Kulik (2002), Liefbroer and Elzinga (2012), Min et al. (2012), Cunningham and Thornton (2006), Schofield and Abraham (2017), Dush et al. (2018) and

Grosjean and Khattar (2018). However, the literature on intergenerational transmission of gender attitudes in developing countries is minimal. One recent paper analyzes the transmission of views around gender equity from parents to adolescent girls in Haryana, India, and finds that parents (especially mothers) have a substantial influence on their children’s reported gender discriminatory attitudes (Dhar et al., 2019). A second paper finds evidence that parents transmit their beliefs about the relative academic ability of girls vis-a-vis boys to their children, and via children to their peers, in China (Eble and Hu, 2019). To my knowledge, however, there is no evidence around the transmission of gender attitudes from adults’ natal households to their marital households in a developing country context.

This paper also contributes to a broader body of work analyzing transmission of economic attitudes across generations, including attitudes toward risk, trust, work, patience and fertility. Fernández (2017) provides a useful overview. However, this literature is substantially theoretical (Doepke and Zilibotti, 2005, 2008), and those papers that do analyze empirical evidence primarily draw on data from Germany (Dohmen et al., 2011) or the U.S. (Fernández and Fogli, 2009). However, one recent paper analyzes the intergenerational transmission of attitudes toward risk in Burkina Faso (Wolff, 2019), and a second provides evidence of differential transmission of risk norms in matriarchal and patriarchal communities in China (Liu and Zuo, 2019).

A particularly relevant strand of this literature examines intergenerational transmission in attitudes toward women’s roles and women’s work: e.g. Farré and Vella (2013) and Johnston et al. (2013) provide evidence of a statistically significant relationship between attitudes toward women’s roles reported by mothers and the attitudes of their adult children in the U.S. and the U.K., respectively, in addition to some correlation with children’s labor market outcomes in adulthood.¹ In a rare analysis using developing country data, Li and Liu (2019) analyze the intergenerational transmission of women’s labor force engagement in China. However, again none of these papers analyze data around household decision-making or equity within a marriage.

In the area of intrahousehold decision-making, this paper also contributes to evidence around the relationship between male dominance in decision-making (or the inverse phenomenon, female decision-making power) and intimate partner violence. There is some evidence from both theoretical and empirical work that increased female decision-making power can increase women’s experience of IPV through a “backlash” effect in which men utilize violence in reaction to a perceived imbalance in status or power within the home (Gage, 2005; Rahman et al., 2011; Weitzman, 2014; Annan et al., 2019). However, there

¹Fernández et al. (2004) similarly provides evidence of a correlation between exposure to a working mother in childhood among men and their wives’ participation in the labor force, albeit without utilizing any variable directly capturing gender attitudes.

is also a large literature documenting that joint decision-making is associated with a lower incidence of IPV relative to dominance of decision-making by one partner, and particularly dominance of decision-making by the husband (Friedemann-Sánchez and Lovatón, 2012; Hindin and Adair, 2002; Singh et al., 2014; Flake and Forste, 2014). One paper presents results suggesting that equitable decision-making in the natal home is negatively correlated with perpetration of violence by adult men, while there is no correlation between IPV and equitable decision-making in the current, marital home (Semenza et al., 2019). Here, I provide evidence around a different dimension of this relationship, the link between decision-making as reported by parents in the natal home and male dominance and use of violence in the current home.

Finally, this paper joins a recent literature noting that there can be substantial discrepancies in reported decision-making within a household when comparing reports provided by husband and wife; however, the pattern of disagreement seems heterogeneous across contexts. Ambler et al. (2019) documents that women in Bangladesh are systematically more likely than their spouses to report that they own assets and are involved in household decision-making. This is consistent with evidence from Ecuador where women report a systematically higher level of engagement in farm management, vis-a-vis their husband's reports (Twyman et al., 2015). In India and Guatemala, men report generally higher levels of autonomy for their wives than women themselves report, a pattern potentially suggestive of social desirability bias in men's responses (Jejeebhoy, 2002; Becker and Schenck-Yglesias, 2006). Other papers simply note frequent disagreement in perceived decision-making and female autonomy, without a substantial bias in favor of either spouse, in Nepal, Tanzania and a cross-country sample of Asian communities (Allendorf; Anderson and Gugerty, 2017; Ghuman et al., 2006).

Relative to the existing literature, this paper makes several contributions. It provides the first evidence around (the absence of) intergenerational transmission of intrahousehold dynamics in a developing country context, and the first evidence of (the absence of) intergenerational transmission between intrahousehold dynamics and intimate partner violence. Accordingly, this paper points to an important direction for the literature to explore further the channels through which gender dynamics can evolve across generations in developing country contexts.

2 Conceptual framework

A substantial multidisciplinary literature has explored the theoretical pathways through which parental attitudes around gender roles and parental decision-making patterns can be transmitted to adult children, and how these attitudes then shape a process of in-

trahousehold bargaining that generates household-level outcomes. Here, I will briefly summarize these pathways, noting that this is only a concise introduction to a much larger literature.

Clearly, the first important pathway through which parental decision-making patterns can be linked to decision-making patterns in the households of their adult children is through a process of intrafamilial socialization, in which parents explicitly teach and/or implicitly model certain gender roles and desired intrahousehold dynamics for their children (Glass et al., 1986). Children, in turn, will reproduce these patterns in their own households (Bisin and Verdier, 2001; Doepke and Zilibotti, 2008). The socialization process can coexist with another closely related pathway, in which parents transmit social statuses or identities — linked to class, ethnicity or race, religion, etc. — that are associated with certain patterns of attitudes and behaviors (Acock, 1984).

A third pathway for the relationship between parental decision-making and children's marital patterns is parenting style (Jan and Janssens, 1998). Certain forms of decision-making within a parental marriage may be associated with different forms of interaction with children (e.g., authoritarian, authoritative, etc.) While these models of parenting styles are drawn primarily from developed countries, existing literature has suggested that variation in parenting methods can be correlated with gender attitudes among children (Arditti et al., 1991; Greenberg and Goldberg, 1989). Fourth, parental attitudes and behaviors linked to gendered patterns of decision-making may be reproduced in their adult children's households partly through homogamy: parents choose spouses for their children with similar attitudes to their own, and the matched spouses then, unsurprisingly, reproduce the targeted pattern (Bisin and Verdier, 2001; Grosjean and Khattar, 2018). This channel may arguably be particularly salient in a rural developing country context such as Ethiopia in which marriages are arranged by parents (Fafchamps and Quisumbing, 2005b; Camfield and Tafere, 2011), and thus parents may be able to directly identify a spouse with desirable attributes.

Once the marital household is established, both partners' beliefs and preferences — including around gender roles — can then be viewed as an input into an intrahousehold bargaining process that generates a household-level allocation of decision-making power and resources. The structure of this bargaining process has been the focus of an extremely large literature. The earliest models of household decision-making posited a unitary structure in which a single set of preferences dictated decisions: either a shared set of preferences, or the preferences of a benevolent dictator (Becker, 1965). In this context, that would imply either a marital matching process in which spouses are extremely well-matched on gender attitudes and then make decisions in accordance with these shared views, or (perhaps more plausibly), a household model in which the husband's preferences

(and thus by extension, the preferences shaped by his natal family) dominate.

However, the unitary model has been widely rejected in both developing and developed country settings (Strauss and Thomas, 1995; Behrman, 1997; Alderman et al., 1995). Accordingly, another class of cooperative bargaining models has developed using a game-theoretic framework in which bargaining power is the function of each individual's outside option or threat point: the potential welfare that she or he would enjoy outside the household (Manser and Brown, 1980; McElroy and Horney, 1981). In the rural Ethiopian context, this may suggest relatively limited bargaining power for women given the economic challenges associated with divorce, and thus male preferences inherited from the male natal home may dominate (Kumar and Quisumbing, 2012). However, this framework also suggests that households in which the woman is more educated and has more claim over assets or other socioeconomic advantages may be more likely to have decision-making patterns that reflect her preferences and thus the decision-making characteristics of her natal home (Quisumbing and Maluccio, 2003).

One implication of cooperative bargaining models is that households will generally achieve Pareto-efficient outcomes, and this prediction has also been rejected by empirical evidence in some, though not all contexts (Udry, 1996; Dercon and Krishnan, 2000). Under noncooperative bargaining models, by contrast, inefficiencies can arise, due to informational challenges, limited commitment, or an inability to pursue potentially welfare-enhancing trades (Lundberg and Pollak, 1994; Fafchamps, 2001). Rather than fully negotiating an implicit agreement around the allocation of power and resources within the household, individuals make decisions in light of their own preferences and budget constraints, and conditional on their spouse's choices (Carter and Katz, 1994). In this bargaining process, the potential effects of each spouse's gender attitudes on the ultimate bargaining outcome could be diverse. For example, a woman who assumes that her husband will prefer a male dominant mode of decision-making (perhaps based on the mode of decision-making in his natal household) may choose to limit her scope of independent decision-making in the hope of receiving some compensatory transfers from her husband; or may opt to strengthen her influence over some independent sphere (or independent economic activity) in order to render herself less vulnerable if her husband's decisions prove to be disadvantageous to her.

In this empirical analysis, I will seek to measure the correlation between decision-making observed among parents, individual attitudes of their adult children, and decision-making in the marital households of those children, but the available data will unfortunately not allow me to identify specific theoretical channels that link these various domains. Nonetheless, it is useful to document the possible channels in order to provide context and interpretation for the results.

3 Empirical strategy

3.1 Context and data

This paper draws on two large-scale surveys focused on intimate partner violence and gender attitudes collected in four districts in rural Ethiopia as part of a broader randomized controlled trial evaluating a culturally appropriate intervention (Unite for a Better Life) targeting intimate partner violence. The sample included sixty-four villages (kebeles) in four districts (Mareko, Meskan, Silte and Sodo) in the Gurague zone of the Southern Nations, Nationalities and People’s Region (SNNPR), randomly selected for inclusion from the sampling frame of all villages within these districts.²

All households including a married couple in which the woman was between 18 and 49 years were eligible for inclusion in the sample, and households were selected via simple random sampling. In polygamous households, one woman was selected via simple random sampling. All individuals provided informed oral consent.

The full sample was surveyed twice, in 2014 and 2017. The baseline survey conducted in 2014 included 6670 individuals, 3384 men and 3386 women; only one respondent was surveyed in each household, and the identity of the respondent surveyed (husband or wife) was determined based on a within-kebele household-level randomization to the “female survey” or “male survey” subarm. For the endline survey conducted in 2017, all baseline respondents were re-visited, and their spouses were additionally included. This yields a sample of 11,835 individuals, 5945 men and 5890 women. (88% of baseline respondents were surveyed again at endline, and 87% of baseline respondents’ spouses.) The outcomes of interest reported in each survey are described in more detail in the next section. It is important to note that inclusion in the surveys was independent from any interest in or participation in the intervention evaluated in the trial; all respondents were surveyed at baseline, and all respondents who could be tracked were surveyed at endline to enable analysis in an intent-to-treat framework.

Analysis of the randomized controlled trial itself is reported separately (Sharma et al., 2020). Unite for a Better Life is a gender-transformative intervention delivered within the context of the Ethiopian coffee ceremony, a culturally established forum for community discussion and conflict resolution. Curricula designed for women, men and couples were developed together with EngenderHealth, and then delivered by Addis Ababa University and the Ethiopian Public Health Association in a series of 14 biweekly sessions facilitated

²In addition, one subvillage (gotte) was selected via simple random sampling within each kebele; subvillages without health extension workers (HEWs) were excluded from the sampling frame. If a subvillage did not have an adequate sample size, the most proximate subvillage was added to create one sampling unit.

by trained community members.³

Ethical approval for the surveys and the associated trial was provided by the Committee on the Use of Humans as Experimental Subjects (COUHES) at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (protocol number 1211005333) and by the Institutional Review Board at the Addis Ababa University College of Health Sciences (protocol number 044/12/SPH). In addition, a community advisory board comprising key stakeholders convened regularly for supervision of all research activities.

3.2 Variables of interest

The analysis draws on three primary sets of variables, primarily reported in the endline survey. First, at endline, both male and female respondents were posed a series of questions about male dominance in intrahousehold decision-making and male engagement in household tasks. Second, at endline, female respondents reported their experience of intimate partner violence. The primary analysis links these household-level outcomes to the third set of outcomes of interest: male dominance of decision-making in the natal household, as reported at baseline.

First, I will summarize the available data about male dominance in intrahousehold decision-making. Both spouses are posed an identical set of three questions querying who is primarily responsible for decision-making around three topics: spending decisions for food and clothing, spending decisions for large purchases, and allocation of time to spend with friends, family, or relatives. The available options include yourself only, spouse only, jointly self and spouse, someone else, or jointly self and someone else. For each category, I construct a binary variable for male dominance in the decision equal to one if the decision is reported to be made by the husband alone.⁴ I also construct an index that is the mean of these three binary variables, summarizing whether male dominance is evident in no domains, one or two out of three reported domains, or all domains.

In addition, both spouses are posed an identical set of four questions querying the level of the husband's engagement in four dimensions of household work traditionally performed by women: cooking, cleaning, laundry and care of children. The available

³More specifically, UBL was delivered by AAU and EPHA in twice-weekly in-person sessions including approximately 20 sampled individuals per group in venues provided by each community (such as schools, health facilities, or community centers). Each session included a coffee ceremony where two participants prepared and served the coffee; and a discussion, including interactive activities, focused on gender norms, sexuality, communication and conflict resolution, HIV/AIDS, and IPV. All participants regardless of gender took turns leading the coffee ceremonies. Female facilitators moderated women's groups, male facilitators moderated men's groups, and one male and one female facilitator jointly moderated each couples' group.

⁴Reports of decision-making by an individual other than the spouses were very rare; on average only .5% of respondents across these three questions chose any response other than self, spouse or joint decision-making.

options for both spouses include: “I do everything,” “usually me”, “shared equally”, “usually partner”, “partner does everything”, or “someone else.” For each category, I construct a binary variable for male engagement in this domain equal to one if the husband is reported to share equally in or usually manage this task. Again, I construct an index that is the mean of these four binary variables; or, if one of the binary variables is missing, the mean of those variables reported.

Second, female respondents report their experience of intimate partner violence over the preceding 12 months. The module employed is the standard set of questions developed by the World Health Organization querying the respondent as to whether she has experienced a series of specific acts in the domains of emotional, physical and sexual violence. I utilize the standard binary variables identifying whether the respondent has experienced any of the specified forms of IPV in the reference period.

Third, both female and male respondents are posed a nearly identical series of questions around male dominance in intrahousehold decision-making with reference to their natal household. More specifically, they are asked to identify the decision-making pattern that prevailed in decisions around spending for food and clothing, spending for large purchases, and choices around education and activities for children. The variables constructed are parallel to those constructed for decision-making in the current marital household: three binary variables for male decision-making, and a summary index.⁵

One important point to note is that due to constraints on survey length, the questions about decision-making in the natal home were posed in the baseline survey, rather than the endline survey. This has two implications. The sample for analysis of intergenerational transmission must be restricted to the respondents observed at both baseline and endline. Intergenerational transmission of attitudes from the husband’s natal family is analyzed in the first subsample of men who were surveyed at both baseline and endline (i.e., the households assigned to “male survey at baseline”). Intergenerational transmission of attitudes from the wife’s natal family is analyzed in the second subsample of women who were surveyed at both baseline and endline (households assigned to “female survey at baseline”). Given that assignment to the male or female baseline survey subarm is random, however, these subsamples can be assumed to be similar on both observable and unobservable characteristics. There is no household for which decision-making in both the husband and wife’s natal households is reported, given that there is no household in which both men and women were surveyed at baseline.

A second implication of the survey design is that patterns of decision-making in the natal and marital homes are not reported contemporaneously. However, since the reports

⁵Similar to the question about the current marital household, respondents could also respond “other” to the question about who primarily made decisions in their natal home, and again the binary variable for male dominance is coded as zero for these respondents.

of decision-making in the natal home are retrospective (referring to a period at least thirty years prior, given the average respondent's age), it is not obvious that the timing of the report is meaningful. Demographic variables of interest (educational status, polygamous status, and socioeconomic status) were similarly measured in the baseline survey.

The analysis of intergenerational transmission is constrained to rely on reports by adults of patterns of behavior they observed from their parents in their own natal home, as there was no separate survey of the elderly parents. The parents' age is not reported, but they are generally not co-resident in the same household (and not necessarily living at the point of the survey). Clearly, relying on indirect reports is suboptimal, but the cost implications of separate surveys of natal households was substantial.

In fact, there is no existing data source to my knowledge that allows for linking of surveys comparing across adults and their elderly parents in a developing country context, while even in the developed country literature, separate linked surveys of adults and their parents are relatively rare.⁶ To address these data gaps, there are some previous papers that use related strategies of recall-based reporting to analyze intergenerational dynamics. Semenza et al. (2019) uses the same strategy as this paper and relies on adults' recall of who made decisions in certain major domains in their natal home. Cunningham and Thornton (2006) use reports of marital quality of parents provided by both the parents themselves and adolescent children; Li and Liu (2019) use adult reported recall of maternal labor supply in childhood to analyze the intergenerational cross-dependence of female employment decisions. In addition, a number of papers in the health literature use adult reported recall of intimate partner violence in the natal home (Ellsberg et al., 1999; Burton et al., 2000; Abrahams and Jewkes, 2005; Gage, 2005; Gass et al., 2011; Kerley et al., 2010; Islam et al., 2014). Arguably, maternal labor supply and intimate partner violence may be easier to observe and recall vis-à-vis parental decision-making; however, given that IPV is also quite sensitive and potentially subject to social desirability bias, some of the challenges may be similar in terms of eliciting accurate recall reports.

3.3 Sample size

As previously noted, the core analysis for this sample is restricted to men and women who were surveyed at baseline and endline. For the male sample, this includes 2931 respondents, and 2919 of those individuals reported information about male dominance in the natal households. This is thus the maximum sample for analysis of transmission from

⁶Dohmen et al. (2011) analyzes data on economic attitudes collected directly from young adults and their parents in Germany, but the data on young adults is collected immediately after entry into adulthood (approximately age 18); Farré and Vella (2013) analyze data collected from mothers and adult children in the U.S. at parallel ages (15–22 years).

the husband’s natal family; the sample in individual regressions may be lower, if certain covariates are missing for some respondents. For the female sample, those respondents surveyed at baseline and endline include 3060 women, and 3053 report information about male dominance in the natal households. Again, this is the maximum sample for analysis of transmission from the wife’s natal family. The number of respondents represented in the full analysis of transmission from the natal family is 5972.

3.4 Specification

The base empirical strategy is simple. Variables capturing household decision-making or intimate partner violence reported by individual i in village v Y_{iv} are regressed on the index of male dominance in the natal home for the same respondent, $Natal_{iv}$. The specification is estimated both with and without additional demographic controls χ_i and village fixed effects λ_v . The demographic controls include binary variables for whether the husband and wife reports any education, the age of both spouses, the number of living children reported for the couple, a binary variable equal to one if the household is polygamous, and four variables capturing socioeconomic status. The latter are an asset index constructed from reports of durable goods owned, a housing index constructed from reports of the house’s physical characteristics, the amount of land reported owned, and a binary variable for whether the baseline respondent reports working outside the household.⁷ Standard errors in all specifications are clustered at the village level.⁸

$$Y_{iv} = Natal_{iv} + \chi_i + \lambda_v + \epsilon_{iv} \quad (1)$$

The richness of the data allows for a number of cross-cutting comparisons. I can analyze transmission of decision-making attitudes from both the husband’s and the wife’s natal family, to decision-making (and male involvement) as reported by both the husband and the wife. This also allows for an analysis of the concordance in decision-making as reported by both husband and wife. A similar analysis is then conducted analyzing transmission of male dominance in decision-making to intimate partner violence in the current, marital household, as reported by the female spouse.

It should be noted, however, that this analysis is correlational. The objective is not to identify the causes of decision-making patterns in current, marital households, but simply

⁷The asset index is the sum of eleven binary variables: whether the household reports ownership of the following items: a watch, a radio, a television, a mobile phone, an electric connection, an ox, a cow, a table, a chair, a bed, and a mattress. The housing index is the sum of four binary variables: whether the house has a cement floor, a latrine, a solid roof, and solid walls.

⁸Given the sample size (approximately 3000 observations in the key regressions) and the dispersion in the independent variables, the analysis can detect with 80% power an effect size of .045, assuming a two-sided test with $\alpha = .1$.

to analyze whether these decision-making patterns reflect decision-making as reported in the natal households.

4 Results

4.1 Summary statistics

Given the relative novelty of the data employed, it may be useful to first explore some detailed summary statistics. Table 1 provides an overview of the sample’s demographic characteristics, focusing on the sample represented in the analysis of transmission of attitudes from the husband’s or wife’s natal household; as noted above, this is a total of 5972 observations. Only 56% of men and 27% of women report any education; their average ages are 39 and 32, respectively, and 11% of households are polygamous. The overwhelming majority of households are primarily engaged in subsistence farming. Only 14% of households report electricity, 46% own a radio, 6% own a television, 55% own a mobile phone, and 64% own an ox.

In order to situate this sample relative to the broader population, I draw on similar data reported in the DHS; for this comparison, I focus only on the rural households from the same region (SNNPR) surveyed in the 2016 DHS (CSA Ethiopia, 2016). 15% of DHS households in rural SNNPR are Muslim, compared to 62% in this sample. 79% of men in the DHS report at least some education, compared to 56% in this sample; reported ownership of a mobile phone by men is 47%, compared to 55% in this sample. 65% of women in the DHS report at least some education, compared to 27% in this sample. In the DHS, 3% of households report a cement floor and 37% a solid (metal) roof; in this evaluation sample, 4% report a cement floor and 36% report a solid roof.⁹ In general, this suggests that households represented in this analysis are characterized by a different religious background and lower levels of education (particularly for women) when compared to the regional population, but socioeconomic status as proxied by housing characteristics and ownership of a mobile phone are broadly similar.

Turning to intrahousehold dynamics, the average index of male dominance in decision-making in this sample is around 0.5, and slightly higher when reported by men than for women. Similarly, the average index of male engagement in traditionally female domains is 0.19 when reported by men, but 0.09 when reported by women. Intimate partner

⁹The subsequent discussion of intergenerational transmission in Section 4.3 will also report exposure to media for sample households. Reported exposure to written media at least once a week among men in the DHS (this sample) is 5% (27%), radio 16% (65%), and television 5% (31%). For women, reported exposure to written media at least once a week is 3% (4%), radio 23% (31%), and television 4% (4%). Thus media exposure for men seems somewhat higher in this evaluation sample vis-a-vis the DHS, while media exposure for women is generally comparable.

violence is extremely common: nearly 60% of women report experience of past-year emotional IPV, and 42% report experience of past-year physical and/or sexual IPV.

Figure 1 summarizes the key patterns of interest graphically comparing reported decision-making in the natal home and current marital home, for male and female respondents. Both male and female respondents are most likely to report that decision-making in their natal homes was characterized by a pattern of male dominance: around 60% of women and 70% of men report that in their natal home, their fathers were dominant in all three decision-making domains. (Again, the decision-making domains highlighted were spending on food and clothing, spending on large purchases, and decision-making around children.) Around 30% of women and 25% of men report that their fathers were dominant in none of these domains, while very few male or female respondents report any intermediate pattern of shared decision-making.

By contrast, there is much more variation in reported patterns of decision-making in the current marital household, as summarized in Figure 2a. Among female respondents, 39% report that their spouses are not dominant in any of these three domains; 26% report an intermediate pattern in which the husband is dominant in one or two domains; and 34% report that their spouses are dominant in all three domains. Male respondents' reports are broadly similar, but skewed more to report an intermediate level of dominance rather than sole female decision-making (or even, to a limited extent, sole male decision-making). Only 29% of men report they are not dominant in any of the three enumerated domains; 40% of men report an intermediate pattern in which they are dominant in one or two domains, and 30% report that they are dominant in all three. Thus comparing across the natal and marital households as described by both men and women, the share of households reported to be characterized by full male dominance in decision-making was reduced by roughly half in a single generation.

Male involvement in household tasks is reported only for the current marital household and not for the natal household of either spouse, and these reports are summarized in Figure 2b. Among female respondents, 80% report that their husband has no engagement in any of the four traditionally female domains of household tasks (again, these are cooking, cleaning, laundry and childcare). 13% report engagement in one domain, and less than 7% report engagement in more than one domain. Among those female respondents who report male engagement in a particular domain, the most common is care of children, followed by laundry.

Among male respondents, by contrast, only 50% report that they have no engagement in any of these household domains. 30% report engagement in one domain, and 10% report engagement in half. Accordingly, men are much more likely to perceive meaningful own-engagement in traditionally female domestic work. Among men who report such

engagement, again care of children is the most common task reported. (Both male and female respondents concur that men are least likely to be engaged in cooking.)

It is important to note that the indices of male dominance in decision-making and male involvement constructed here capture only certain dimensions of intrahousehold dynamics; this is an unavoidable limitation of using specific quantitative variables to measure these more complex concepts. However, I can provide some evidence that these indices are in fact significantly predictive of intimate partner violence, arguably one of the most extreme manifestations of male dominance. Table A1 in the Appendix reports regressions in which a binary variable for any past-year physical and/or sexual IPV is regressed on the reported indices of male dominance and male involvement, both as reported by husband and wife; there is evidence of significantly higher incidence of IPV in households characterized by higher male dominance, and lower incidence of IPV in households characterized by higher male involvement. (In both cases, the magnitude of the relationship is significantly higher for the variable as reported by the wife.) This suggests that the indices employed, while incomplete, are in fact conveying meaningful information about intrahousehold dynamics.

In addition, the use of recall data about decision-making in the spouses' natal homes may lead to some questions about the reliability of this data. The implications of measurement error will be explored further in Section 4.3, but some points relevant to the summary statistics can be briefly noted here. If adults simply recall decision-making by their parents inaccurately, the high incidence of full male dominance in decision-making in the natal home could reflect a high incidence of intermediate male dominance that is exaggerated in recollection; however, even given this assumption, the shift over generations would be substantial. The share of households reporting majority male dominance decreased from 72% to 54%, according to men, or from 63% to 50%, according to women. To further explore variation due to accuracy of recall, the graphs reported in Figure 1 can be reproduced for subsamples: couples in which both the wife and the husband are below the 25th percentile for age (26 for women and 32 for men), and couples in which the marital duration is below the 25th percentile (eight years). In both cases, the presumption is that these individuals were more recently residing in their natal homes, and thus can provide higher-quality information. The observed patterns reported in Figure A1 in the Appendix are consistent, suggesting that there is no systematic bias introduced by inaccurate recall.¹⁰

¹⁰Some data on shifts in decision-making over time can also be gleaned by comparing the Demographic and Health Survey rounds from 2000 and 2016 (CSA Ethiopia, 2000, 2016). The available question around decision-making pertains to who primarily makes decisions about women's earnings, for women who report earnings in cash. There is evidence of a substantial shift over this period, albeit from a somewhat surprising baseline: in 2000, 74% of respondents reported that they alone made decisions about the use of funds that they earned and 16% reported making decisions jointly with their partner, while in 2016,

Moreover, given that the focus of this analysis is intergenerational transmission, it seems plausible that relying on adults' reports of parental decision-making in their natal household will generate bias away from zero: adults are more likely to report that decision-making patterns in their natal households were similar to the patterns that they themselves exhibit, under the hypothesis that they view these patterns as normatively desirable (or simply normal). Accordingly, any evidence of intergenerational transmission that is observed may be plausibly considered to be an upper bound.

To sum up, there are two clear patterns that emerge from this analysis. First, patterns of male dominance in household decision-making in this context have shifted dramatically in only a single generation. Current adult respondents (both men and women) overwhelmingly concur that their own fathers dominated decision-making in their natal households, but report a much more heterogeneous pattern of male dominance in decision-making in their current, marital households. Second, concordance between male and female respondents around current patterns of decision-making and time allocation in the same household is relatively low. Focusing simply on the summary indices of decision-making, only 27% of couples concur on the mean level of male dominance in decision-making. Women are more likely to report no male dominance in any domains, while men are more likely to report that they have dominance in some domains and not others. 41% of couples concur on the mean level of male involvement in traditionally female domains, but this higher level of concordance primarily reflects mutual recognition that the husband has no involvement.

4.2 Intergenerational transmission

Table 2 presents the primary evidence around intergenerational transmission, estimating equation (1). The dependent variables are the summary indices of male dominance in decision-making and male engagement in household tasks as previously defined, reported by the husband (in Columns (1), (3), (5) and (7)) or the wife (in Columns (2), (4), (6), and (8)). The independent variables are the summary indices of male dominance in decision-making in the natal household, as reported by the husband or the wife. Again, the analysis of decision-making in the husband's and wife's natal households is conducted in two separate subsamples, corresponding to households in the "husband baseline" and

62% report that they made decisions jointly with their partner, and 30% said their decisions were made independently. (In both survey rounds, the remaining women report that decisions are made by their husband alone.) This suggests a substantial shift toward joint decision-making, but from a baseline in which male dominance (in the domain of female earnings) was minimal. However, this question about control over female earnings may have somewhat limited relevance for the sample analyzed in this paper given that only 25% of women in the sample report working outside the home, and they overwhelmingly report working for family members.

“wife baseline” subarms.

It is clear that there is relatively little evidence of intergenerational transmission in male dominance in decision-making. The coefficients of interest are small in magnitude, varying in sign and generally statistically insignificant, and this pattern is consistent when the regressions are estimated both unconditional on covariates (in Panel A) and conditional on covariates, including village fixed effects (in Panel B). The only coefficient that is significant when estimated conditional on covariates is a weakly positive correlation between male dominance in the husband’s natal family and current male dominance as reported by the wife (Column (2) of Panel B). I also report at the bottom of each panel joint test that $\beta = 0$ estimating across Columns (1) through (4), for the husband’s natal family, and Columns (5) through (8), for the wife’s natal family.¹¹ The joint tests generally fail to reject the hypothesis that the effects are equal to zero, particularly conditional on covariates. Intuitively, around 30% to 40% of male and female respondents report that their natal household was not characterized by male dominance in all three domains of decision-making, but there is no evidence that these respondents report current patterns of decision-making or time engagement in their marital households that are relatively more equitable vis-a-vis other respondents who report that their natal household was characterized by full male dominance.¹²

Table 3 reports similar evidence around the relationship between male dominance in decision-making in the natal home and current patterns of intimate partner violence as reported by the wife. Again, the coefficients of interest are small and generally statistically insignificant, suggesting that patterns of decision-making in the natal home do not predict IPV. The only coefficient that is significant when estimated conditional on covariates is a weakly positive coefficient suggesting that male dominance in the wife’s natal home predicts experience of sexual intimate partner violence (Column (7) of Panel B), but again the joint tests generally fail to reject the hypothesis that effects are equal to zero, particularly conditional on covariates. Respondents who were exposed to a more equitable pattern of decision-making in their natal home (or whose husbands were exposed to a more equitable pattern of decision-making) do not show any evidence of a decreased probability of experiencing IPV.¹³

¹¹The joint test is implemented by jointly estimating all regressions of interest in a seemingly unrelated regression framework (using the command `suest` in Stata) and conducting a Wald test of cross-model hypotheses (using the command `test`).

¹²Table A2 in the Appendix replicates this analysis for the two specific domains of decision-making that are reported in both the natal and the marital households, decision-making around purchases of food and clothing (also described as daily purchases) and decision-making around large purchases. The null pattern is again consistent.

¹³Tables A3 and A4 in the Appendix report the results from Panel B of Tables 2 and 3 including the coefficients estimated for additional covariates. In Table A3, education of both spouses is negatively correlated with male dominance in decision-making and positively correlated with male engagement

One possible critique of these results is that they may partially reflect the effects of the educational interventions implemented as part of the randomized controlled trial. Given evidence presented separately that these interventions were effective in generating some shifts in intrahousehold decision-making and a reduction in IPV, this may have attenuated the correlation between characteristics of the natal and marital households. In order to evaluate this hypothesis, I re-estimate the primary specification (1) using only the sample of households assigned to the control arm, who were not exposed to any interventions. The results as reported in Table 4 show broadly the same pattern; for concision, only the results estimated conditional on covariates are reported. Parallel to the main sample, there is some weak evidence that reported male dominance in decision-making in the husband’s natal family increases male dominance in current decision-making, but again only as reported by the wife (Column (2) of Panel A), and only when estimated unconditional on covariates.

Again, both the dependent and the independent variables in these regressions may be measured with some error. Measurement error in the dependent variable will increase the standard errors, but will not generate bias in the estimated coefficients. Insofar as the coefficients are small in magnitude (as well as statistically insignificant), the conclusion that there is no strong relationship between natal and marital family characteristics would be unchanged even given the presence of some noise in the dependent variables. Measurement error in the independent variable, however, could generate attenuation bias toward zero and produce a null result, a hypothesis that is explored further in the next section.

To sum up, there is very little evidence that patterns of decision-making in the spouses’ natal households predict patterns of decision-making, male engagement and intimate partner violence in current households in rural Ethiopia. Interestingly, this is in contrast to evidence from developed countries, primarily the U.S., where previous work has suggested that intergenerational transmission of gender attitudes remained significant even in periods of rapid social change, e.g. between the 1950s and the 1980s (Moen et al., 1997), and the 1970s and 2000s (Min et al., 2012; Liebroer and Elzinga, 2012). While speculative, the different pattern observed in this sample would be consistent with the hypothesis that the pace of change in gender roles in developing countries has been much more rapid vis-a-vis what was observed in developed countries over the last half-century.

Moreover, this absence of intergenerational transmission is observed in a context where

in traditionally female domains; polygamous status is positively correlated with male dominance and negatively correlated with male engagement; and the asset and housing indices are negatively correlated with male dominance and positively correlated with male engagement. In Table A4, the wife’s age is negatively correlated with IPV; polygamous status is positively correlated with IPV; and the pattern for socioeconomic status is heterogeneous, with the housing index positively correlated with IPV and the assets index negatively correlated with IPV.

major channels for transformation of gender attitudes (particularly education, exposure to media, and engagement in outside labor) are relatively limited, particularly for women. As previously noted, only 56% of men and 27% of women ever attended school; only 22% of men and 8% of women report completing primary school (six years of education). Exposure to media for men is non-trivial, as 27% report reading a newspaper at least once a week, 31% report watching television at least once a week, and 65% report listening to radio at least once a week. For women, however, exposure is much more limited: only 4% regularly access a newspaper, 31% radio, and 4% television. (Given that ownership rates of radio and television are relatively low, this pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that men are accessing media outside the home or in public spaces that are not readily accessible to women.) For outside labor, 18% of men and 25% of women report ever working outside the home, but of this subsample, 89% of men and 94% of women report working for a family member, suggesting likely engagement in a household enterprise that may not necessarily imply significant interaction with non-household members.

However, despite these low levels of exposure to important channels for the transformation of gender attitudes, this transformation appears to have been substantial over the last two generations. This evidence is also consistent with a broader literature arguing that major social and economic reforms including the reform of the family code in 2000 and the initiation of community-based land registration in 2003 have stimulated a broader shift toward enhanced gender equity in Ethiopia (Holden et al., 2011; Kumar and Quisumbing, 2015).

Alternate specifications To further explore the robustness of these results, I estimate several other specifications. First, I re-estimate the primary results using only the sample of monogamous households, given that patterns of decision-making in the small minority (approximately 10%) of polygamous households may be more complex. These results are reported in Table A5 in the Appendix. Again, for concision, the table includes only the specifications estimated conditional on covariates. The evidence is generally consistent with the primary results and suggests there is no robust evidence of intergenerational transmission. (The coefficient on sexual IPV remains weakly significant, in Column (7) of Panel B.)

Second, I re-estimate the primary results excluding respondents who report that one of their biological parents was never present in their home when they were growing up. 10% of women and 7% of men report that one parent was never present in the natal home (usually the father); these respondents are posed the same questions around decision-making, but unsurprisingly, they usually report that decision-making was primarily managed by the parent who was present in the home. (There are cases, however,

where respondents report both that their father was physically absent and that he dominated decision-making, suggestive perhaps of a migrant worker or otherwise mobile head of household who nonetheless remained influential within the household.) The results reported in Table A6 in the Appendix suggest that the same pattern is observed when the sample is restricted to those who reported that both parents were present.

Third, it may be useful to examine the robustness of the primary results to re-defining the variables capturing male dominance in decision-making. In the primary analysis, male dominance is identified only when the decision is reported to be made by the husband alone. An alternate definition would identify male dominance when the decision is reported to be made by the husband or by both spouses jointly, implying that women have significant influence only when they are solely responsible for a particular decision; previous work has identified that women’s estimated decision-making power can be extremely sensitive to the precise indicator used in a diverse set of developing country contexts (Peterman et al., 2015). Accordingly, I re-estimate the male dominance variables for both the natal and the marital households using this alternate definition, and then re-estimate the primary specifications as reported in Table A7 in the Appendix. The results are again entirely consistent, suggesting that there is no evidence of intergenerational transmission for male dominance in decision-making or intimate partner violence.

Fourth, given that the key variables of male dominance and male engagement are reported by both spouses, I can re-estimate the primary specifications including as an additional covariate the other spouse’s report of the dependent variable. (In other words, any specification including as the dependent variable the husband’s report of male dominance in decision-making includes as an additional covariate the wife’s report of male dominance, and vice versa.) These results are reported in Table A8 in the Appendix, and are again consistent. The coefficients on the other spouse’s report are generally positive and significant, suggesting that one spouse’s report of intrahousehold dominance is indeed predictive of the other spouse’s report, despite the observed pattern of some discordance previously documented in Section 4.1.

Correlations with socioeconomic status One possible relevant channel for any observed relationship between decision-making in the natal and marital households is socioeconomic status. If male dominance in the natal household is associated with socioeconomic status in that household and there is some intergenerational transmission of wealth, then households in which spouses have different patterns of exposure to decision-making in childhood may also be characterized by different current socioeconomic status. In order to analyze this hypothesis, I estimate the primary specification (1) using measures of household socioeconomic status as dependent variables. In addition to the asset

index, housing index, and the amount of land reported owned (previously employed as covariates in the main specification), I also analyze a dummy variable for whether the husband's primary occupation is farming; due to an error in survey design, this variable is reported only for the sample in which the wife was surveyed at baseline.

The results are reported in Table 5, and show that the coefficients of interest are statistically insignificant. A joint test across Columns (1) to (3) fails to reject the hypothesis that there is a null effect of the husband's natal family's decision-making characteristics on socioeconomic status on average, and a similar joint test across Columns (4) to (7) fails to reject the hypothesis of a null effect of the wife's natal family's characteristics.

4.3 Measurement error in reports of the natal household

One possible interpretation of these results is that they primarily reflect a significant degree of measurement error in reports of decision-making in the natal household. These reports are retrospective following the lapse of a considerable period of time in some cases. Respondents may not have had very precise perceptions of their parents' decision-making processes as children, and it is also clear from the absence of concordance in reports around current household decision-making that these perceptions can differ dramatically within the same family. If there is limited informational signal in these reports, then the pattern of nulls observed may simply reflect this noise.

Here, I present some evidence that there is in fact informational content in the reports of decision-making in the natal home that predicts individual-level variables reported by the current spouses: in particular, age at marriage (presumably directly determined by the natal family), and the spouses' individually reported gender attitudes (as distinct from their reports of decision-making and intimate partner violence in the household). This raises the puzzle as to why patterns in the natal home can be predictive of individual households, but not joint household outcomes. I further demonstrate that assortative matching with respect to spouses' stated views on gender equity and gender attitudes is low: accordingly, while natal characteristics predict own spouses' characteristics, spouses' characteristics are weakly correlated with each other, and actual patterns of decision-making within the household do not strongly reflect the natal background of either spouse.

First, I analyze whether decision-making characteristics of the natal family predict age at marriage, particularly for the wife. Child marriage (defined as marriage prior to the age of eighteen) remains common in Ethiopia, though its prevalence has declined rapidly over the last ten years. The women in this sample are on average 32 years at the point of survey, and report a median age at marriage of 17; 67% report that they

married prior to the age of 18.¹⁴ (By contrast, men report a median age at marriage of 22, and only 10% married prior to age eighteen.) This is broadly consistent with nationwide evidence: Demographic and Health Survey data suggests that women born between the years of 1980 and 1985 (corresponding to the average age in this sample) face an average probability of child marriage of over 70%. DHS data similarly suggests that around 40% of spouses report an average age gap of between 2 and 5 years, and 50% report an average age gap of more than five years (United Nations Children’s Fund, 2018).

If male dominance in decision-making in the natal home is a plausible proxy for more traditional gender attitudes that are favorable to early marriage, it may be plausible to expect a correlation, especially given that age of marriage is presumably determined almost solely by the natal family. To evaluate this relationship, age at marriage for the husband and wife is regressed on decision-making in the natal family, and the results are reported in Panels A and B of Table 6 for estimates unconditional and conditional on covariates respectively. The evidence presented in Columns (1) and (2) suggests that the husband’s age at marriage is generally positively correlated with male dominance in the natal household, but that women raised in households with more male dominance in decision-making are younger at marriage: in a household characterized by full vis-a-vis no male dominance, a daughter marries around .4 years earlier, on average. This is consistent with the hypothesis that traditional and non-equitable gender attitudes strongly favor early marriage for women, and later marriage for men (consistent with a larger age gap between spouses that would plausibly favor male dominance in decision-making).

Second, I analyze the effects of the natal family’s patterns on individual gender attitudes. To measure individual attitudes, each respondent was posed a series of questions about justifications for intimate partner violence and can choose to concur or fail to concur with each justification. The IPV justification index is the sum of all cases in which the respondent concurred that IPV is justified. In addition, each respondent is posed a series of statements summarizing traditional or non-equitable views about gender roles, and can choose to concur or fail to concur; the gender equity index is the sum of a series of binary variables for concurrence. Thus for both indices, a higher value can be interpreted as evidence of less gender-equitable attitudes.

Note that these variables are distinct from the previously examined outcomes linked to household decision-making and intimate partner violence in that they capture individually stated views that are not necessarily shared. Of course it is plausible that spouses’ views within a household would be correlated, but it is also perfectly possible for spouses to simply disagree. By contrast, intrahousehold decision-making is assumed to have

¹⁴The respondents did not report whether the marriage was arranged, though given the early reported marital timing, it is plausible to hypothesize that these were primarily arranged marriages.

some objective characteristics, though those characteristics may be (and frequently are) perceived or reported differently by the two spouses.

Table 6 presents the results in Columns (3) through (6). Here, by contrast to the previous results, the coefficients are generally positive and statistically significant, particularly for the male respondents (for the female respondents, significant correlations are observed only unconditional on covariates). The joint tests evaluating whether the coefficients across these specifications in both cases reject this hypothesis at the one percent level, suggesting there is significant transmission between the natal family's patterns of decision-making and individual gender attitudes. However, it should still be noted that insofar as there is measurement error in the variables reported around natal family characteristics, these results may still be characterized by attenuation bias, and thus may underestimate the true relationship of interest.

This returns us to the previously mentioned puzzle. If natal family characteristics predict individual gender-related attitudes, why is there no relationship between these characteristics and patterns of decision-making and intimate partner violence in the marital household? If there was assortative mating (and spouses matched on gender attitudes), this would be implausible: natal family characteristics would predict individual gender attitudes, attitudes would match across spouses, and then spouses would presumably converge on a pattern of behavior reflecting these attitudes that would be shared with (both) natal households.

By contrast, the pattern here seems to be consistent with very limited assortative matching on the dimension of gender attitudes, and this can be directly confirmed: the within-household correlation in the IPV justification index is only .08, and the within-household correlation in the gender equity index is only .03. Accordingly, spouses who are shaped by their natal family's patterns of gendered decision-making enter a marriage with gender attitudes that are correlated with this natal family pattern, but cohabit with a spouse who is not necessarily similar. Moreover, they do not seem to exhibit views on gender equity that converge with their spouse's views over time. The fact that the realized pattern of decision-making and IPV is quite different also suggests that it is not merely the husband's preferences (correlated with the preferences of his natal family) that are dominating within the household, as would be suggested by a unitary model or a bargaining model with very limited bargaining power for women. Rather, the observed pattern seems to be intermediate between both spouses' inherited preferences.

The question of why there is so little assortative matching with respect to gender attitudes is itself an interesting one, though it should be noted that the data only allows evaluation of the extent of assortative matching along a very narrow dimension of measured views around IPV and gender roles. Some speculative hypotheses can be

identified. There is evidence that assortative matching with respect to wealth and/or assets is common in Ethiopia (Fafchamps and Quisumbing, 2005a,b), suggesting that other characteristics may be paramount in the marriage market; if matching with respect to assets is important, then this could be a reason that a limited correlation is observed for other, attitudinal variables. In addition, spouses' views around gender-related questions may be hard to observe prior to marriage.¹⁵ Alternatively, there may be specific patterns in the marriage market that generate this divergence: i.e, if women raised in more traditional (gender-inequitable households) are viewed as more attractive partners, they may attract higher status partners who are more educated, but these men themselves may have less traditional gender attitudes (or may evolve less traditional gender attitudes over time) due to their educational or socioeconomic trajectory. These hypotheses remain an interesting direction for future research.

5 Conclusion

This paper provides evidence around patterns of intergenerational transmission of gender attitudes and intimate partner violence in rural Ethiopia, drawing on a novel large-scale dataset in which both male and female respondents report on patterns of decision-making and male engagement in their marital household as well as their natal households. Several key stylized facts emerge from the analysis. First, patterns of male dominance in intra-household decision-making have shifted dramatically in a generation. While at least 60% of both male and female respondents report that their fathers dominated decision-making in their natal households, patterns of male dominance in current marital households are more balanced, with the average household reporting male dominance in around half of the key domains explored. Levels of male engagement in female housework are relatively low. Second, there are non-trivial differences in the perception of decision-making and male engagement as reported by husband and wife.

In the analysis of intergenerational transmission, evidence suggests that there is no correlation between patterns of male dominance in decision-making in the natal household and patterns of decision-making in the current, marital household. Similarly, there is no correlation between male dominance in the natal households and current reports of intimate partner violence in the marital household. Further research may benefit from exploring in more detail the processes that shape the evolution of gender norms and male dominance across generations.

¹⁵While in general there is a large literature analyzing assortative matching, the majority of this evidence focuses on observable characteristics such as education, wealth, and assets; one recent paper does show evidence of assortative matching with respect to non-cognitive skills and time and risk attitudes in sub-Saharan Africa, more specifically Mozambique, Cote d'Ivoire, and Malawi (Boxho et al., 2020).

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
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
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Figure 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS ON SPOUSAL DECISION-MAKING: NATAL AND MARITAL HOUSEHOLDS

(a) Intergenerational comparison: Women




(b) Intergenerational comparison: Men




Notes: The graphs summarize reported patterns of male dominance in decision-making as reported by female respondents (in Figure 1a) and male respondents (in Figure 1b) for both their natal home and their current marital home. The x-axis denotes the share of major decisions dominated by the male spouse, with reference to three domains: purchases of food and clothing, large purchases, and time allocation / care of children.

Figure 2: SUMMARY STATISTICS ON SPOUSAL DECISION-MAKING: CONCORDANCE BETWEEN SPOUSES

(a) Concordance between spouses: Male dominance in decision-making



(b) Concordance between spouses: Male engagement in household tasks



Notes: The graphs summarize reported patterns of male dominance in decision-making (in Figure 2a) and male engagement in household tasks (in Figure 2b) as reported by female and male respondents. The x-axis in Figure 2a denotes the share of major decisions dominated by the male spouse, with reference to three domains: purchases of food and clothing, large purchases, and time allocation / care of children. The x-axis in Figure 2b denotes the share of household tasks in which the male is engaged, with reference to four tasks: cooking, cleaning, laundry and care of children. (In some cases spouses provide answers to a subset of questions, and thus men can be reported engaged in one, two or three out of only three tasks.)

Table 1: Summary statistics

Panel A: Demographic variables				
Variable	Mean	Std. dev.	Obs.	
Any education: husband	.563	.496	5966	
Any education: wife	.266	.442	5967	
Age: husband	38.675	8.475	5971	
Age: wife	31.670	7.060	5969	
Polygamous	.108	.311	5972	
Muslim	.620	.485	5972	
Primary occupation is agriculture	.88	.325	3049	
House has cement floor	.037	.189	5972	
House has solid roof	.365	.481	5972	
Household has electricity	.141	.348	5942	
Household owns radio	.457	.498	5934	
Household owns television	.056	.23	5936	
Household owns mobile phone	.549	.498	5923	
Household owns ox	.644	.479	5919	
Panel B: Intrahousehold dynamics				
Male dominance in decision-making: Husband's natal family	.719	.437	2919	
Male dominance in decision-making: Wife's natal family	.628	.462	3053	
Male dominance in decision-making: Reported by husband	.519	.398	5795	
Male dominance in decision-making: Reported by wife	.480	.435	5751	
Male engagement in female domains: Reported by husband	.194	.244	5700	
Male engagement in female domains: Reported by wife	.085	.196	5719	
Past-year experience of emotional IPV: Reported by wife	.591	.492	5773	
Past-year experience of physical IPV: Reported by wife	.210	.407	5748	
Past-year experience of sexual IPV: Reported by wife	.369	.483	5743	
Past-year experience of physical and/or sexual IPV: Reported by wife	.422	.494	5747	

Notes: This table reports summary statistics for the analysis sample.

Table 2: Intergenerational transmission of household decision-making patterns

	Male dominance decision-making Husband (1)	Male dominance decision-making Wife (2)	Male engagement household domains Husband (3)	Male engagement household domains Wife (4)	Male dominance decision-making Husband (5)	Male dominance decision-making Wife (6)	Male engagement household domains Husband (7)	Male engagement household domains Wife (8)
Panel A: Base estimates								
Male dominance husband's family	-.025 (.019)	.011 (.021)	.020 (.013)	-.006 (.007)				
Male dominance wife's family					.026 (.021)	.010 (.017)	-.023** (.009)	-.010 (.007)
Joint test $\beta = 0$								
Obs.	2919	2809	2902	2813	3001	3039	2910	3003
Panel B: Estimates conditional on covariates								
Male dominance husband's family	-.012 (.019)	.036* (.021)	.001 (.012)	-.005 (.007)				
Male dominance wife's family					-.0004 (.020)	-.0009 (.015)	-.013 (.009)	-.004 (.007)
Joint test $\beta = 0$								
Obs.	2889	2779	2872	2783	2996	3034	2905	2998
Mean dep. var.	.522	.480	.193	.085	.522	.480	.193	.085

Notes: Each column reports a separate regression. The dependent variable is the summary index of male dominance in decision-making or male engagement in household tasks in the current household, reported by the husband or wife. The independent variables are the summary index of male dominance in the husband's natal family or the wife's natal family, as specified. All regressions in Panel B are estimated conditional on covariates including village fixed effects, binary variables equal to one if the husband and wife reports any education, the age of both spouses, the number of living children, a polygamy binary variable, an asset index, a housing index, the amount of land owned, and a binary variable for outside labor. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. Asterisks denote significance at the ten, five and one percent level.

Table 3: Intergenerational transmission to intimate partner violence

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Emotional	Physical	Sexual	Physical and/or sexual	Emotional	Physical	Sexual	Physical and/or sexual
Panel A: Base estimates								
Male dominance husband's family	-.056** (.028)	-.003 (.018)	-.013 (.024)	-.024 (.025)				
Male dominance wife's family				.016 (.018)	-.002 (.018)	.041** (.017)	.034* (.018)	
Joint test $\beta = 0$.124				.065
Obs.	2817	2801	2796	2800	3053	3044	3044	3044
Panel B: Estimates conditional on covariates								
Male dominance husband's family	-.018 (.023)	.007 (.017)	.011 (.018)	.002 (.020)				
Male dominance wife's family					-.003 (.016)	-.013 (.018)	.028* (.016)	.020 (.018)
Joint test $\beta = 0$.123				.241
Obs.	2787	2773	2767	2787	3048	3039	3039	3048
Mean dep. var.	.592	.210	.370	.421	.592	.210	.370	.421

Notes: Each column reports a separate regression. The dependent variables are binary variables equal to one if the wife reports experience of emotional, physical, sexual, or physical and/or sexual intimate partner violence over the last twelve months. The independent variables are the summary index of male dominance in the husband's natal family or the wife's natal family, as specified. All regressions in Panel B are estimated conditional on covariates including village fixed effects, binary variables equal to one if the husband and wife reports any education, the age of both spouses, the number of living children, a polygamy binary variable, an asset index, a housing index, the amount of land owned, and a binary variable for outside labor. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. Asterisks denote significance at the ten, five and one percent level.

Table 4: Intergenerational transmission: Control arm sample

	Male dominance decision-making		Male engagement household domains		Male dominance decision-making		Male engagement household domains	
	Husband (1)	Wife (2)	Husband (3)	Wife (4)	Husband (5)	Wife (6)	Husband (7)	Wife (8)
Male dominance husband's family	.011 (.044)	.094*** (.033)	-.0004 (.020)	-.003 (.009)				
Male dominance wife's family					.079* (.045)	-.0006 (.034)	.0005 (.014)	-.0007 (.014)
Joint test $\beta = 0$.387
Obs.	695	676	691	678	748	755	719	751

	Emotional		Physical and/or sexual		Emotional		Physical and/or sexual	
	Physical	Sexual	Physical	sexual	Physical	Sexual	Physical	sexual
Male dominance husband's family	.035 (.034)	.035 (.029)	-.002 (.029)	.035 (.029)				
Male dominance wife's family					-.001 (.030)	.004 (.026)	.034 (.036)	.040 (.037)
Joint test $\beta = 0$.803
Obs.	678	675	673	678	760	756	756	760

Notes: Each column reports a separate regression, and the sample is restricted to households in the control arm. All regressions are estimated conditional on covariates including village fixed effects, binary variables equal to one if the husband and wife reports any education, the age of both spouses, the number of living children, a polygamy binary variable, an asset index, a housing index, the amount of land owned, and a binary variable for outside labor. The dependent variables in Panel A are the summary index of male dominance in decision-making or male engagement in household tasks in the current household, reported by the husband or wife; the dependent variables in Panel B are indices of experience of intimate partner violence, reported by the wife. The independent variables are the summary index of male dominance in the husband's natal family or the wife's natal family, as specified. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. Asterisks denote significance at the ten, five and one percent level.

Table 5: Effect of natal family characteristics on current socioeconomic status

	Base estimates			Conditional on covariates			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Land owned	Assets index	Housing index	Land owned	Asset index	Housing index	Farming
Male dominance husband's family	-.080 (.118)	.003 (.087)	-.011 (.033)				
Male dominance wife's family				-.112 (.081)	.074 (.067)	-.026 (.028)	.007 (.012)
Joint test $\beta = 0$.900				.251
Obs.	2999	2999	2999	3176	3176	3176	3173

Notes: Each column reports a separate regression. All regressions are estimated conditional on covariates including village fixed effects, binary variables equal to one if the husband and wife reports any education, the age of both spouses, the number of living children, a polygamy binary variable, an asset index, a housing index, the amount of land owned, and a binary variable for outside labor, omitting covariates that are identical to the dependent variable. The independent variables are the summary index of male dominance in the husband's natal family or the wife's natal family, as specified. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. Asterisks denote significance at the ten, five and one percent level.

Table 6: Intergenerational transmission: individual gender attitudes


	Age at marriage		IPV justification		Gender equity	
	Husband	Wife	Husband	Wife	Husband	Wife
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Base estimates						
Male dominance husband's family	.223 (.185)		.251 (.190)		.218 (.152)	
Male dominance wife's family		-.369*** (.097)		.176** (.076)		.170 (.130)
Joint test $\beta = 0$.000
Obs.	3005	3149	2919	3053	3016	3179
Panel B: Estimates conditional on covariates						
Male dominance husband's family	.348* (.179)		.420** (.178)		.306** (.121)	
Male dominance wife's family		-.287*** (.098)		.075 (.073)		.156 (.128)
Joint test $\beta = 0$.002
Obs.	2976	3144	2889	3048	2986	3174

Notes: Each column reports a separate regression. The dependent variables are reported age at marriage for the husband and wife (in Columns 1 and 2) and summary indices of attitudes toward IPV and gender equity (in Columns 3 through 6). The IPV justification index is the sum of all cases in which the respondent concurred that IPV is justified. The gender equity index is the sum of a series of binary variables for concurrence with statements capturing non-equitable gender roles. The independent variables are the summary index of male dominance in the husband's natal family or the wife's natal family, as specified. All regressions in Panel B are estimated conditional on covariates including village fixed effects, binary variables equal to one if the husband and wife reports any education, the age of both spouses, the number of living children, a polygamy binary variable, an asset index, a housing index, the amount of land owned, and a binary variable for outside labor. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. Asterisks denote significance at the ten, five and one percent level.


Appendix

Figure A1: SUMMARY STATISTICS ON SPOUSAL DECISION-MAKING: SUBSAMPLES


(a) Women in couples below 25th percentile of age




(b) Men in couples below 25th percentile of age



(c) Women in couples below 25th percentile of marital duration



(d) Men in couples below 25th percentile of marital duration



Notes: The graphs summarize reported patterns of male dominance in decision-making as reported by female respondents (in Figures A1a and A1c) and male respondents (in Figures A1b and A1d) for both their natal home and their current marital home. The x-axis denotes the share of major decisions dominated by the male spouse, with reference to three domains: purchases of food and clothing, large purchases, and time allocation / care of children. The sample in Figure A1a and Figure A1b is restricted to individuals in couples in which both spouses are below the 25th percentile of age, and the sample in Figures A1c and A1d is restricted to couples below the 25th percentile of marital duration.

Table A1: Household decision-making, male engagement and intimate partner violence

	Physical and/or sexual violence			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Male dominance decision-making (Husband)	.061*** (.020)			
Male dominance decision-making (Wife)		.205*** (.019)		
Male engagement (Husband)			-.089*** (.028)	
Male engagement (Wife)				-.277*** (.036)
Obs.	5614	5869	5524	5837

Notes: Each column reports a separate regression. The dependent variable is the binary variable corresponding to reported physical and/or sexual intimate partner violence. The independent variables are the indices of male dominance in decision-making and male engagement in household tasks in the current household, reported by the husband or wife. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. Asterisks denote significance at the ten, five and one percent level.

Table A2: Intergenerational transmission: Decision-making by domain

	Daily purchases		Male dominance		Male dominance		Male dominance	
	Husband (1)	Wife (2)	Large purchases Husband (3)	Large purchases Wife (4)	Daily purchases Husband (5)	Daily purchases Wife (6)	Large purchases Husband (7)	Large purchases Wife (8)
Male dominance husband's family	.004	-.015						
Daily purchases	(.015)	(.013)						
Male dominance husband's family			.020	-.014				
Large purchases			(.015)	(.015)				
Male dominance wife's family					.007	-.008		
Daily purchases					(.012)	(.013)		
Male dominance wife's family							.015	.007
Large purchases							(.012)	(.013)
Obs.	2885	2770	2876	2772	2991	3029	2992	3031

Notes: Each column reports a separate regression. The dependent variable is the binary variable corresponding to male dominance in decision-making in the specified domain (purchases of food / clothing as daily purchases, or large purchases) in the current household, reported by the husband or wife. The independent variables are the corresponding variables in the husband's natal family or the wife's natal family, as specified. All regressions are estimated conditional on covariates including village fixed effects, binary variables equal to one if the husband and wife reports any education, the age of both spouses, the number of living children, a polygamy binary variable, an asset index, a housing index, the amount of land owned, and a binary variable for outside labor. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. Asterisks denote significance at the ten, five and one percent level.

Table A3: Intergenerational transmission of household decision-making: All coefficients

	Male dominance decision-making		Male engagement household domains		Male dominance decision-making		Male engagement household domains	
	Husband	Wife	Husband	Wife	Husband	Wife	Husband	Wife
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Male dominance husband's family	-.012 (.019)	.036* (.021)	.001 (.012)	-.005 (.007)				
Male dominance wife's family					-.0004 (.020)	-.0009 (.015)	-.013 (.009)	-.004 (.007)
Husband education	-.020 (.015)	.014 (.019)	.032*** (.009)	.007 (.007)	-.041** (.018)	-.003 (.017)	.025*** (.009)	.006 (.007)
Wife education	-.019 (.015)	-.034 (.025)	.002 (.013)	.008 (.008)	-.018 (.023)	-.045* (.026)	.012 (.012)	.009 (.010)
Husband age	-.001 (.002)	-.002 (.002)	.001 (.001)	.001 (.0009)	.0009 (.001)	-.0003 (.001)	-.002** (.0009)	-.0007 (.0006)
Wife age	.0003 (.002)	-.002 (.002)	-.003* (.001)	-.001 (.0009)	-.001 (.002)	-.005*** (.002)	-.001 (.001)	-.0005 (.001)
Polygamous	.037 (.031)	.006 (.037)	-.055*** (.018)	-.043*** (.013)	.056** (.026)	.003 (.021)	-.003 (.013)	.006 (.012)
Living children	-.001 (.004)	-.001 (.005)	-.005** (.002)	-.001 (.002)	-.007 (.005)	.012* (.006)	.002 (.003)	.004 (.002)
Land owned	.001 (.002)	.001 (.004)	.001 (.002)	-.002* (.001)	-.0005 (.003)	.002 (.003)	-.002 (.002)	-.004*** (.001)
Housing index	-.014 (.011)	-.005 (.013)	.010 (.009)	-.004 (.005)	-.023* (.013)	.007 (.011)	.019** (.007)	.015** (.007)
Asset index	-.0008 (.003)	.00006 (.005)	.006** (.003)	.004** (.002)	-.004 (.004)	-.013*** (.004)	.002 (.003)	.002 (.002)
Outside labor	.002 (.021)	-.019 (.025)	-.006 (.013)	-.015 (.011)	-.030 (.020)	-.026 (.018)	-.010 (.011)	-.010 (.010)
Obs.	2889	2779	2872	2783	2996	3034	2905	2998

Notes: Each column reports a separate regression. The dependent variable is the summary index of male dominance in decision-making or male engagement in household tasks in the current household, reported by the husband or wife. The independent variables are the summary index of male dominance in the husband's natal family or the wife's natal family, as specified. All regressions in Panel B are estimated conditional on covariates including village fixed effects, binary variables equal to one if the husband and wife reports any education, the age of both spouses, the number of living children, a polygamy binary variable, an asset index, a housing index, the amount of land owned, and a binary variable for outside labor. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. Asterisks denote significance at the ten, five and one percent level.

Table A4: Intergenerational transmission to intimate partner violence: All coefficients

	Emotional	Physical	Sexual	Physical and/or sexual	Emotional	Physical	Sexual	Physical and/or sexual
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Male dominance husband's family	-.018 (.023)	.007 (.017)	.011 (.018)	.002 (.020)				
Male dominance wife's family					-.003 (.016)	-.013 (.018)	.028* (.016)	.020 (.018)
Husband education	-.009 (.019)	-.001 (.015)	.003 (.018)	-.008 (.017)	-.008 (.019)	.001 (.015)	-.027 (.018)	-.013 (.020)
Wife education	.055*** (.021)	.011 (.019)	.0005 (.025)	-.0008 (.025)	-.0004 (.025)	.022 (.024)	-.002 (.026)	-.007 (.026)
Husband age	.001 (.003)	-.002 (.002)	-.002 (.003)	-.005* (.002)	.002 (.002)	.002* (.001)	.003* (.002)	.004** (.002)
Wife age	-.0004 (.003)	-.002 (.003)	-.003 (.002)	-.00005 (.002)	-.008*** (.002)	-.006*** (.002)	-.007*** (.003)	-.008*** (.003)
Polygamous	.045 (.045)	.060 (.038)	.060 (.040)	.056 (.046)	.014 (.028)	.022 (.024)	-.020 (.024)	-.030 (.025)
Living children	-.003 (.007)	-.002 (.005)	.0008 (.006)	.0005 (.006)	.016*** (.005)	.003 (.006)	.008 (.006)	.006 (.007)
Land owned	.001 (.004)	.003 (.003)	-.002 (.003)	-.002 (.003)	.015*** (.005)	.001 (.004)	.00002 (.004)	.002 (.004)
Housing index	.012 (.015)	.020* (.012)	.025* (.014)	.024* (.014)	.009 (.013)	-.007 (.010)	.003 (.014)	.0005 (.014)
Asset index Outside labor	-.009* (.005)	-.010** (.004)	-.012** (.005)	-.015*** (.004)	-.028*** (.005)	-.013*** (.004)	-.013*** (.004)	-.018*** (.005)
Obs.	2787	2773	2767	2787	3048	3039	3039	3048

Notes: Each column reports a separate regression. The dependent variables are binary variables equal to one if the wife reports experience of emotional, physical, sexual, or physical and/or sexual intimate partner violence over the last twelve months. The independent variables are the summary index of male dominance in the husband's natal family or the wife's natal family, as specified. All regressions in Panel B are estimated conditional on covariates including village fixed effects, binary variables equal to one if the husband and wife reports any education, the age of both spouses, the number of living children, a polygamy binary variable, an asset index, a housing index, the amount of land owned, and a binary variable for outside labor. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. Asterisks denote significance at the ten, five and one percent level.

Table A5: Intergenerational transmission: Monogamous sample

	Male dominance decision-making Husband (1)	Male engagement household domains Wife (2)	Male engagement household domains Husband (3)	Male dominance decision-making Husband (4)	Male dominance decision-making Wife (5)	Male engagement household domains Husband (6)	Male engagement household domains Wife (7)	Male engagement household domains Wife (8)
Panel A: Intrahousehold dynamics								
Male dominance husband's family	-0.010 (.019)	.043* (.022)	.007 (.013)	-.004 (.007)				
Male dominance wife's family					.0005 (.022)	.004 (.017)	-.012 (.010)	-.003 (.007)
Joint test $\beta = 0$.309					.736
Obs.	2700	2598	2683	2600	2566	2585	2488	2559
Panel B: Intimate partner violence								
	Emotional	Physical	Sexual	Physical and/or sexual	Emotional	Physical	Sexual	Physical and/or sexual
Male dominance husband's family	-0.013 (.024)	.012 (.017)	.015 (.018)	.003 (.021)				
Male dominance wife's family					-.004 (.018)	-.013 (.019)	.029* (.016)	.022 (.018)
Joint test $\beta = 0$.349					.160
Obs.	2604	2590	2584	2604	2594	2589	2589	2594

Notes: Each column reports a separate regression, and the sample is restricted to monogamous households. All regressions are estimated conditional on covariates including village fixed effects, binary variables equal to one if the husband and wife reports any education, the age of both spouses, the number of living children, a polygamy binary variable, an asset index, a housing index, the amount of land owned, and a binary variable for outside labor. The dependent variables in Panel A are the summary index of male dominance in decision-making or male engagement in household tasks in the current household, reported by the husband or wife; the dependent variables in Panel B are indices of experience of intimate partner violence, reported by the wife. The independent variables are the summary index of male dominance in the husband's natal family or the wife's natal family, as specified. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. Asterisks denote significance at the ten, five and one percent level.

Table A6: Intergenerational transmission: Sample reporting both parents present in home

	Male dominance decision-making Husband (1)	Male engagement household domains Wife (2)	Male dominance decision-making Husband (3)	Male engagement household domains Wife (4)	Male dominance decision-making Husband (5)	Male engagement household domains Wife (6)	Male dominance decision-making Husband (7)	Male engagement household domains Wife (8)
Panel A: Intrahousehold dynamics								
Male dominance husband's family	-.009 (.021)	.044** (.022)	.002 (.013)	-.007 (.007)				
Male dominance wife's family					-.007 (.021)	-.00002 (.019)	-.016* (.010)	-.007 (.008)
Joint test $\beta = 0$								
Obs.	2672	2562	2656	.288 2566	2693	2726	2608	.380 2692
Panel B: Intimate partner violence								
	Emotional	Physical	Sexual	Physical and/or sexual	Emotional	Physical	Sexual	Physical and/or sexual
Male dominance husband's family	-.018 (.025)	.001 (.019)	.005 (.021)	-.005 (.024)				
Male dominance wife's family					-.011 (.017)	-.014 (.020)	.035* (.019)	.030 (.021)
Joint test $\beta = 0$.789				.067
Obs.	2570	2558	2552	2570	2740	2731	2731	2740

Notes: Each column reports a separate regression, and the sample is restricted to individuals who report both parents were present in the natal home. Regressions are estimated conditional on covariates including village fixed effects, binary variables equal to one if the husband and wife reports any education, the age of both spouses, the number of living children, a polygamy binary variable, an asset index, a housing index, the amount of land owned, and a binary variable for outside labor. The dependent variables in Panel A are the summary index of male dominance in decision-making or male engagement in household tasks in the current household, reported by the husband or wife; the dependent variables in Panel B are indices of experience of intimate partner violence, reported by the wife. The independent variables are the summary index of male dominance in the husband's natal family or the wife's natal family, as specified. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. Asterisks denote significance at the ten, five and one percent level.

Table A7: Intergenerational transmission: Alternate definition of male dominance

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
		Male dominance decision-making Husband Wife	Male engagement household domains Husband	Male engagement household domains Wife	Male dominance decision-making Husband	Male dominance decision-making Wife	Male engagement household domains Husband	Male engagement household domains Wife
Panel A: Intrahousehold dynamics								
Male dominance husband's family	-.023** (.011)	-.002 (.012)	.006 (.015)	.003 (.009)				
Male dominance wife's family					.0009 (.004)	-.006 (.011)	.013 (.010)	-.002 (.008)
Joint test $\beta = 0$.294				.563
Obs.	2889	2779	2872	2783	2996	3034	2905	2998
Panel B: Intimate partner violence								
		Emotional	Physical	Sexual	Physical and/or sexual	Emotional	Physical	Sexual
Male dominance husband's family	.005 (.029)	.003 (.027)	.032 (.024)	.037 (.025)				
Male dominance wife's family					-.007 (.021)	-.016 (.019)	.010 (.021)	-.001 (.019)
Joint test $\beta = 0$.369				.676
Obs.	2787	2773	2767	2787	3048	3039	3039	3048

Notes: Each column reports a separate regression. All regressions are estimated conditional on covariates including village fixed effects, binary variables equal to one if the husband and wife reports any education, the age of both spouses, the number of living children, a polygamy binary variable, an asset index, a housing index, the amount of land owned, and a binary variable for outside labor. The dependent variables in Panel A are the summary index of male dominance in decision-making or male engagement in household tasks in the current household, reported by the husband or wife; the dependent variables in Panel B are indices of experience of intimate partner violence, reported by the wife. The independent variables are the summary index of male dominance in the husband's natal family or the wife's natal family, as specified. An alternate definition of male dominance is employed in which male dominance is identified if a decision is reported to be made by the husband alone, or both spouses jointly. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. Asterisks denote significance at the ten, five and one percent level.

Table A8: Intergenerational transmission: Alternate specification

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Male dominance decision-making Husband	Male dominance decision-making Wife	Male engagement household domains Husband	Male engagement household domains Wife	Male dominance decision-making Husband	Male dominance decision-making Wife	Male engagement household domains Husband	Male engagement household domains Wife
Male dominance husband's family	-0.012 (.020)	.040* (.023)	-0.003 (.013)	-0.003 (.008)				
Male dominance wife's family					.0008 (.021)	.0002 (.016)	-0.014 (.009)	-0.0009 (.007)
Husband's report (dominance)		-0.015 (.022)				.046** (.020)		
Wife's report (dominance)	-0.011 (.016)				.039** (.017)			
Husband's report (engagement)				.026* (.016)				.055** (.022)
Wife's report (engagement)			.048 (.029)				.065** (.026)	
Joint test $\beta = 0$.420				.603
Obs.	2682	2682	2676	2676	2865	2865	2759	2759

Notes: Each column reports a separate regression. All regressions are estimated conditional on covariates including village fixed effects, binary variables equal to one if the husband and wife reports any education, the age of both spouses, the number of living children, a polygamy binary variable, an asset index, a housing index, the amount of land owned, and a binary variable for outside labor. The dependent variables are the summary index of male dominance in decision-making or male engagement in household tasks in the current household, reported by the husband or wife; each specification also includes as an additional control variable the same index as reported by the other spouse. The independent variables are the summary index of male dominance in the husband's natal family or the wife's natal family, as specified. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. Asterisks denote significance at the ten, five and one percent level.