

Short-term and long-term effects of cash for work: Evidence from a randomized controlled trial in Tunisia

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Abstract

While a growing literature analyzes the economic effects of cash for work programs in developing countries, there remains little evidence about the longer-term effects of these interventions on both economic and non-economic outcomes. This paper presents findings from a randomized controlled trial evaluating a three month intervention providing public works employment in rural Tunisia that incorporates two dimensions of randomization: community-level randomization to treatment and control, and individual-level randomization among eligible individuals. A sample of 2,718 individuals was tracked over five years. The findings suggest that cash for work leads to significant increases in labor market engagement, assets, consumption, financial inclusion, civic engagement, psychological well being, and women’s empowerment one-year post-treatment; however, these effects have largely attenuated to zero five years post-treatment, with the exception of a small positive effect on assets. There is also evidence of positive spillover effects within treatment communities, but these effects similarly attenuate over time. JEL codes: O12, O15.

1 Introduction

Workfare or public works employment programs have long been prominent in many developing countries, and form an important part of the social safety net in contexts such as India (the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme) and Ethiopia (the Productive Safety Net Program). These programs typically have some of the same advantages as large-scale cash transfers — namely, they are a simple strategy to directly boost consumption and reduce poverty among the poorest households — but the additional requirement for employment can have several positive effects. First, public employment may be effectively self-targeting to those who do not have other higher-return opportunities. Second, employment can offer the opportunity for participants to build skills and thus have long-term positive effects on employment trajectories. Third, employment activities can be directed to facilitate the construction and/or maintenance of local assets that may have positive externalities.

In practice, however, the latter channels can be hard to substantiate, and workfare programs often center around low-skilled manual maintenance labor that is unlikely to result in any skills transfer and may not have high returns in terms of asset creation (Murgai et al. 2016). Recent reviews of primarily quasi-experimental evidence have suggested that public works programs generally do not seem to boost employability or enhance skills, and as such, it may be challenging to justify the higher costs of implementing such programs vis-a-vis simpler direct cash transfer interventions (Gehrke and Hartwig 2018).

This paper presents findings from a randomized controlled trial in Tunisia designed to evaluate the short- and long-term effects of the Community Works and Local Participation (CWLP) pilot, a program that provided short-term paid employment to unemployed workers. Compensation provided was around \$180 per month or \$550, relative to average monthly consumption per capita in the control arm of \$245; thus this was a proportionally large transfer, providing around two months allocation of consumption expenditure. (The compensation of \$180 monthly was also significantly above the minimum wage, at that time around \$114 per month.) Individuals were eligible if they were aged 18 to 60, had been unemployed for at least 12 months and were not enrolled in secondary or tertiary education.

The evaluation employs a novel design in order to estimate treatment effects along multiple dimensions: first, a community-level randomization assigned 80 rural villages (imadas) to either treatment or control status. Second, in each community, local leaders identified individuals who were eligible for the program based on the stated criteria, and in treatment communities, a random subset of these eligible individuals were offered employment. There are thus three samples of interest that are observed: the eligible and treated individuals in treatment communities; the eligible and untreated individuals in treatment communities; and the eligible and untreated individuals in control communities. This design allows us to generate high-quality estimates of both

the direct and the spillover effects of the intervention by comparing eligible individuals in treatment communities to untreated counterparts in control communities.

The primary sample includes 2,718 individuals who were sampled from the list of eligible individuals constructed at the community level; no baseline survey was conducted, though pre-treatment data at the locality level from the census in year 2014 is available and is used to verify balance in the village-level randomization. The intervention and associated public works activities were rolled out between April and September 2015, and the first follow-up survey was implemented approximately one year later between April 2016 and January 2017. This was followed by a second, long-term follow-up conducted between December 2020 and April 2021, approximately five and half years following program implementation. The measured outcomes include a range of variables capturing labor force participation by both the target beneficiary and other household members, economic welfare, investment in human capital, social and civic engagement, psychosocial well-being, and women's empowerment. All outcomes of interest were pre-specified in a registered analysis plan, and treatment effects for outcome families were estimated following [Kling et al. \(2007\)](#). We also report p-values based on both traditional statistical inference and corrected for multiple hypothesis testing.

The primary findings based on the cross-village comparison of treated and untreated individuals suggest that the intervention had significant and large short-term effects on both primary economic outcomes and secondary psychosocial outcomes. We observe significant increases of between .1 and .2 standard deviations in indices of labor market participation, assets, consumption, and financial inclusion, as well as increases of comparable magnitude in civic engagement, psychosocial well-being, and women's empowerment. (Null effects are observed for outcomes linked to human capital investment, coping mechanisms conditional on shocks, and social cohesion.) An examination of the detailed treatment effects for specific indicators reveals these effects are driven

by a large increase in the probability that the respondent as well as other household members report any income-generating activity, leading to an increase in expenditure particularly on housing costs, an increased stock of assets including livestock and consumer durables, and a substantial (proportional) increase in savings relative to a base of essentially zero.

By the five-year follow-up, however, these effects have substantially attenuated. For economic outcomes, the positive effects on assets and consumption remain of comparable magnitude and are weakly statistically significant, but only the increase in assets remains significant when corrected for multiple hypothesis testing. The effects on the other indices are uniformly statistically insignificant, and the hypothesis that the effects in rounds one and two are consistent can be rejected for the labor market variables, financial inclusion, psychological well-being, and women's empowerment and agency. The estimated treatment effects for primary (economic) outcomes are also robust to any corrections for bias introduced by selection into the survey sample or attrition over time in both survey rounds, but the treatment effects for secondary outcomes are not robust to this correction.

The findings based on the cross-village comparison of untreated individuals in treatment and control communities — allowing for estimates of local spillover effects of the intervention — suggest a largely similar pattern. In the short run, there are positive effects on the primary and secondary outcomes of similar magnitude (again between .1 and .2 standard deviations), other than financial inclusion. The effects on secondary outcomes are somewhat reduced, though the increases in civic engagement and psychosocial well-being remain statistically significant. In the long run, none of the estimated effects for the spillover sample remain statistically significant. In addition, the estimated spillover effects in the short-run are no longer statistically significant when corrections for selection into the evaluation sample are implemented.

Finally, unsurprisingly given that the effects on direct beneficiaries and eligible non-

targeted individuals are parallel, the within-village comparison between individuals who are eligible and offered employment and eligible but not offered employment suggests that the difference between these two sets of outcomes is statistically insignificant in both the short and the long run.

Our paper makes several contributions to the existing literature. First, we provide new evidence about the long-term effects of workfare or public works employment programs. We particularly contribute by tracking a wide range of both economic and psychosocial outcomes over a much longer time horizon (up to five years). Much of the existing literature analyzing the effects of public works employment has centered around two large, government-run programs, NREGA in India and the PSNP in Ethiopia, that can provide seasonal employment over a number of years. An extremely large literature has analyzed the effects of NREGA on labor market outcomes ([Berg et al. 2018](#); [Imbert and Papp 2015](#)), poverty ([Muralidharan et al. 2017](#); [Ravi and Engler 2015](#)), migration ([Imbert and Papp 2019](#)), conflict ([Khanna and Zimmermann 2017](#); [Fetzer 2020](#)), education, child cognition, and child labor ([Afridi et al. 2016](#); [Mani et al. 2020](#); [Li and Sekhri 2019](#); [Shah and Steinberg 2021](#)), and infant health ([Chari et al. 2019](#)). For the PSNP, evidence suggests impacts are limited on average due to low transfer levels, though there are some effects on food security and livestock assets ([Gilligan et al. 2009](#); [Berhane et al. 2014](#)) as well as child nutrition ([Porter and Goyal 2016](#)). In urban areas, the rollout of PSNP leads to a shift from private to public employment, as well as enhanced local amenities ([Abebe et al. 2021](#)).

Beyond these two large recurring programs, other papers have analyzed short-term public works employment programs similar to those analyzed here. In Côte d'Ivoire, a randomized trial suggested that seven months of temporary employment in road maintenance had no persistent effects fifteen months later, other than possibly higher productivity in non-agricultural employment ([Bertrand et al. 2017](#)); similarly, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, there were minimal persistent effects of a four-

month job offer 18 months later, other than modest effects on employment and savings ([Brandily-Snyers et al. 2022](#)). A randomized trial of workfare in Colombia found positive effects on consumption and labor supply that persisted up to a year ([Alik-Lagrange et al. 2017](#)). In Argentina, a public works employment project implemented in response to the 2002 economic crisis reduced unemployment and poverty ([Galasso and Ravallion 2004](#)). In Comoros, another randomized trial of a public works employment program found evidence of a significant increase in international migration ([Gazeaud et al. 2021](#)). In Yemen, public works employment increased labor supply and seemed to have a protective effect vis-a-vis adverse coping mechanisms during an economic downturn ([Christian et al. 2015](#)). In Malawi, however, a public works employment program had no effects on food security or use of fertilizer ([Beegle et al. 2017](#)).

Importantly, very few of the papers in the existing public works employment literature analyze effects on psychosocial or non-economic outcomes; and none, to our knowledge, report treatment effects for a horizon longer than about two years. We thus contribute by providing novel evidence around the effects of public works employment on civic engagement, social cohesion, psychological well being, and women's empowerment, and analyzing the effects on both economic and non-economic outcomes for a much longer follow-up period of five years.

Second, we contribute to a growing literature analyzing spillover effects of cash transfers or other cash benefit programs. Here, we benefit from a robust double-randomized design that allows us to rigorously estimate spillover effects on individuals who are eligible for the program and who report similar observable characteristics, but who are randomly not offered the program, and we find spillovers that are large, positive, and of equal magnitude to the effects for direct beneficiaries. (This design has previously been used by only two other papers to our knowledge, ([Egger et al. 2019](#)) and ([Beegle et al. 2017](#)).) In the existing literature, [Angelucci and De Giorgi \(2009\)](#) analyzes the effects of Progresa on local non-eligible households and finds evidence of

significant positive spillovers in terms of consumption, and similar positive spillovers are reported in a large evaluation of unconditional cash transfers in Kenya (Egger et al. 2019). Large positive spillovers of BRAC’s Targeting the Ultrapoor — a multifaceted graduation program that also encompasses cash transfers — are also documented for consumption and economic outcomes, as well as for nutritional outcomes (Bandiera et al. 2017; Raza et al. 2018). There is also evidence of positive spillovers from economic aid provided to refugees (Taylor et al. 2016). By contrast, there has also been evidence of negative spillovers of cash transfers in some contexts, particularly in more remote communities (Beegle et al. 2017; Haushofer and Shapiro 2016; Filmer et al. 2021).

This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the context, the experimental design and the data collection. Section 3 presents the analytical strategy, the outcomes of interest, and the main results. Section 4 concludes.

2 Methodology

2.1 Setting and intervention

In the decade prior to the 2011 Jasmine revolution, Tunisia’s economy showed consistent growth and was among the leading performers in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, with average annual growth in gross domestic product of 4.2 percent (World Bank 2011). In subsequent years however, Tunisia’s economic growth slowed. Higher food prices exacerbated economic woes and in January 2014 culminated in political unrest and the toppling of Zine Ben Ali, the country’s long-time ruler (Campante and Chor 2012). Average annual GDP growth between 2011 and 2015, the year in which this project was launched, was only 1.7%.

In addition, the revolution substantially impacted access to basic services. In some localities, critical facilities such as clinics and hospitals were closed, while food supply

routes were disrupted, thus making disadvantaged populations even more vulnerable. Existing plans to expand or improve health and education services especially in disadvantaged areas stalled ([World Bank 2011](#)).

Against this backdrop, the World Bank and the Tunisian Ministry of Vocational Training and Employment launched the Community Works and Local Participation (CWLP) project in Jendouba, a rural and underserved governorate. This pilot project sought to provide temporary employment opportunities to long-term unemployed men and women on local labor-intensive public works projects. The project's aims were to provide beneficiaries with immediate income support to help smooth consumption and to strengthen their future earning capacity (via the provision of skills development or work experience), while also improving productive infrastructure.

The CWLP program financed approximately 40 public works projects in Jendouba Province, for which workers were required to be between 18 and 60 years old, and to have been out of work for at least 12 months. These local public works projects were chosen by local non-governmental organizations in conjunction with community leaders. Eligible projects all included the upgrading of local infrastructures and services, and a minimum of 70% of the budget was required to be devoted to labor costs.

A first round of CWLP projects was implemented between 2012 and 2014; our study focuses on the second round of projects, launched between April and September 2015 with an average duration of around three months.¹ In identifying eligible individuals, priority was given to the poorest households, women, at-risk youth, and heads of households. Those who completed the program received a wage of around \$9.15 (in purchasing power parity-adjusted dollars) daily, for an estimated total of 825 Tunisian dinars or approximately \$550 over three months. The wage provided was thus substantially above the prevailing minimum daily wage at the time, \$6.60.

¹Figure [A1](#) in the Appendix shows the timeline for the launch and conclusion of each project.

2.2 Experimental design

The second round of the CWLP evaluated in this paper was rolled out as a randomized controlled trial in 80 imadas, or villages, in the Jendouba governorate, the lowest level administrative unit in Tunisia.² We implemented the randomization in two steps in order to capture both direct and spillover effects of the CWLP. In the first step, the village-level randomization, we first stratified the 80 sample villages into three groups by population—less populated, moderately populated, and more populated.³ Randomization was conducted within these three strata, assigning 40 villages to treatment and 40 villages to control.

In the second stage, the individual-level randomization, local NGOs in treatment villages compiled lists of around 60–65 poor unemployed residents eligible for employment in public work projects. We randomly selected around 42 of these eligible workers to participate in each village; the others were not offered employment. Among those who were offered employment, take-up of employment was around 80%, yielding around 34 participating workers in each village.⁴

In addition, local leaders in the control villages also compiled lists of 50 village residents who would have been eligible for the program if their villages had been assigned to treatment, thus constituting the control sample. This selection of eligible individuals in control communities was conducted approximately a year following the selection of individuals in treatment communities, but leaders were advised to refer retrospectively to individuals' outcomes in selecting beneficiaries. Figure 1 depicts

²The Jendouba governorate comprises 95 imadas in total, 15 of which are classified as urban. These urban imadas were excluded from the evaluation, leading to a sample of 80 rural imadas.

³Jendouba's rural villages range in size from 1,000 to 7,000 residents. We classified villages with fewer than 2,090 residents as less populated; between 2,095 and 4,156 residents as moderately populated; and more than 4,156 residents as more populated.

⁴The randomization of individuals into an offer of employment was conducted in two phases; following the first round of employment offers and the response, in which around 20% of individuals declined to participate, additional replacements were randomly selected and offered employment in order to meet the target participant numbers.

the experimental design, and Figure A1 shows a map of the project locations. All randomization procedures were conducted by the research team using Stata.

2.3 Data collection

The evaluation did not include a baseline survey, though baseline administrative data at the imada level is available drawing on the Tunisia population census from 2014. Instead, two rounds of follow-up surveys were conducted. The sampling frame is constituted by the beneficiary lists constructed in both treatment and control communities as described above. In treatment villages, the beneficiary list included an average of around 60–65 beneficiaries per village, for a total of 2,537 total respondents, and the entire beneficiary list was targeted for the survey. (Within the sample list, 1925 households or 76% were successfully surveyed and thus included in the evaluation.) In the control villages, the survey firm randomly sampled 20 individuals out of the 40 individuals included on the constructed list of eligible individuals.

The total target sample was thus 2,537 individuals in the treatment villages and 800 individuals in the control villages; the realized evaluation sample, as captured in Figure 1, was 1924 individuals in the treatment villages, and 794 in the control villages, for a total of 2,718 individuals.⁵ Further details about potential bias introduced by potential selection into the survey sample is discussed in Section 3.5.

We conducted the first round of data collection between April 2016 and January 2017, on average roughly 12 months after the end of the intervention in each treatment village (paid employment generally ended around August 2015).⁶ The second round of data collection was conducted between December 2020 and March 2021, approximately

⁵In addition, data was collected from a separate random sample of individuals in both treatment and control communities. This data is not employed in this analysis.

⁶Data collection was contracted to a local professional team, under close supervision by the research team. The research team also developed all survey instruments and other research protocols as well as the training of field staff (i.e., data enumerators and supervisors).

five and a half years post-treatment, as depicted in Figure 2. From the evaluation sample of 2,718 individuals surveyed in the first follow-up survey, the second follow-up survey included 2,185 individuals for an attrition rate of 19.6 percent (22.5% in treatment villages and 12.6% in control villages); this difference is not statistically significant. Again, more details about potential bias induced by attrition between the first and second follow-up survey rounds will be provided in Section 3.5.

The survey instruments that were used in both survey rounds consisted of a questionnaire administered to the individual who was identified as eligible for cash for work.⁷ The survey collected information on the composition of the household, the economic activities of its members, assets and consumption, the economic shocks faced by the household, social cohesion and civic participation, women’s empowerment, and psychological well-being.

3 Empirical analysis

3.1 Outcomes of interest and conceptual framework

The outcomes of interest were pre-specified at the launch of the experiment and are organized by outcome family. The six primary outcome families include labor market outcomes for the primary respondent, labor market outcomes for other household members, consumption, assets, financial inclusion, and human capital. The five secondary outcome families include coping mechanisms (vis-a-vis shocks experienced by the household), psychological well-being, social cohesion, civic engagement, and women’s empowerment and agency.

Tables 1 and 2 summarize the variables included in each outcome family. The

⁷The two survey rounds were almost, but not entirely identical. The second round included some minor modifications to portions of survey questions used in the first round as well as a novel module on the COVID-19 pandemic, which did not exist at the time of the first endline survey round.

summary outcome measures are constructed following [Kling et al. \(2007\)](#) and are generally defined identically for the first and second rounds of follow-up. Details about the cases in which the outcome families were not defined identically, and about any deviations from the pre-analysis plan, are provided in Appendix A.⁸

Given a large existing literature analyzing the effect of public works employment on the outcomes of interest, we do not provide a full conceptual framework, but simply a brief overview of potentially relevant channels through which the intervention may shape these outcomes. For the economic outcomes of interest, there are two primary channels for effects. The first channel is the direct effect generated by the infusion of cash into the household that could be used to amass assets, invest in training, purchase goods, generate savings, or potentially invest in an income-generating activity (or fund a search for employment), either for the main respondent or another household member. The second channel is the indirect effect if respondents develop skills or amass experience in their period of public works employment that leads to an increased probability of an economic activity post-intervention; or, if respondents use the cash earned to fund the start-up or search costs associated with identifying a new economic activity. This increased level of economic activity and income may in turn may lead to positive effects on other economic variables.

For secondary outcomes of interest, we hypothesize that enhanced economic status through the direct and indirect channels may lead to a shift away from adverse coping mechanisms in the face of shocks (e.g., households who have more resources will not be required to disinvest in assets in response to a negative shock). We also hypothesize that enhanced economic status could lead to increased engagement in the community both socially and civically and enhanced psychological well-being. There is also the potential for enhanced female empowerment in the form of increased economic engagement

⁸The pre-analysis plan was originally registered with EGAP and can be found on-line, <https://osf.io/nd53a>, EGAP registration ID 20170520AA.

or decision-making, though there could also be a backlash effect in response to the intervention that would lead to decreased economic empowerment for women.

3.2 Baseline balance

To assess balance across villages assigned to the treatment and control arms, Panel A of Table 3 reports results summarizing covariate balance at the village level using data from the 2014 population census. The villages in the sample are characterized by an average population size of around 1000 households or 4000 individuals; around 73% of the population is constituted by adults. The unemployment rates are high, averaging above 25% for individuals aged fifteen and above, and education rates are also notably low compared to national averages: more than half of heads of household report no education. We uniformly observe that there are no statistically different differences in these covariates comparing across the treatment and control villages.

Panel B of Table 3 then reports balance using time-invariant covariates at the household level; these covariates were measured in the first follow-up survey, but are presumptively unchanged vis-a-vis baseline.⁹ We report the mean for households randomly selected for an offer of employment in treatment villages in Column (1); for households randomly selected for a non-offer of employment in treatment villages in Column (2); and for households in control villages in Column (3). We then report the p-value corresponding to a joint test of equality across treatment coefficients in a specification in which the covariate of interest is regressed on a village-level and individual-level treatment dummy (conditional on strata fixed effects). Again, we generally observe that there are no statistically significant differences in covariates comparing across these three sets of households. The average respondent identified as eligible for public works employment is around 40 years old; 55% are female, and 70%

⁹Of course, marital status is not strictly time-invariant, but given low rates of divorce in rural Tunisia, it is unlikely to show meaningful shifts over time for a predominantly middle-aged population.

are married. A majority (around 60%) report no education. Engagement in the labor market is extremely low (fewer than 10% report working more than three months in 2013), consistent with the programmatic criteria targeting the long-term unemployed. The overwhelming majority were born locally.

We can also characterize the sample vis-a-vis the national poverty line by drawing on the estimated level of consumption subsequently measured for households in the control arm. The estimated level of consumption in the control arm in the follow-up survey conducted in 2016 was \$245 per month for the household, or around \$60 monthly per capita given a household size of four. This is broadly similar to an estimated national poverty line of around \$70 monthly (\$2.60 daily) as of 2010 (Molini 2019), but suggestive of a consumption level around 20% lower than this poverty line even six years later. This low level of consumption relative to even the national poverty line in Tunisia is consistent with the hypothesis that the program's targeting criteria effectively identified the long-term unemployed or economically inactive.

3.3 Results

Given the randomized design, the primary empirical specification is simple. Outcome variables of interest reported at the individual level Y_{iv} for individual i in village v are regressed on a binary variable for treatment assignment T_v . (Some, though not all of those variables are in fact reported by the individual for the whole household: i.e., household-level consumption and household ownership of assets.) In the first specification, we restrict the sample to those individuals sampled in treatment communities and offered treatment as well as those individuals sampled in control communities in order to measure direct intervention effects. Given that no baseline data was collected, this is not an ANCOVA specification and there are no controls for baseline levels. We also include binary variables for the randomization strata, λ_v , and standard errors are

clustered at the village level.

$$Y_{iv} = \beta_1 T_v + \lambda_v + \epsilon_{iv} \quad (1)$$

We also estimate a parallel specification identical to equation (1) including only those individuals in the treatment arm who were eligible for treatment but not offered treatment (as well as individuals in the control communities) in order to estimate local spillover effects.

The final specification of interest exploits the within-village randomization, using data from treatment villages only; outcomes are regressed on the individual-level variable for an offer of work $WorkOffer_{vi}$.

$$Y_{iv} = \beta_2 WorkOffer_{iv} + \epsilon_{iv} \quad (2)$$

We report both conventional p-values and q-values corrected for multiple inference, setting the rate of false discovery at $q = 0.05$ (Benjamini and Hochberg 1995). For a detailed description of calculation of q-values, see Anderson (2008).

Figure 3 and Table 4 capture the main results. For concision, the figure presents the primary estimated treatment effects comparing across treated and eligible individuals in treatment and control villages respectively, with estimated coefficients for round one and round two. In Table 4, Panel A presents results from round one and Panel B for round two. The first set of columns, (1) through (5), captures the main treatment effect estimated comparing across treatment and control villages using specification (1), analogous to the figure; the second set of columns, (6) through (10), captures the estimated spillover effects comparing across treatment and control villages, using specification (1) for the sample of eligible individuals not offered treatment; and the third set of columns, (11) through (15), captures the within-village treatment effect, using specification (2).

Figure 3 shows that there are significant and positive effects of cash-for-work comparing across eligible individuals in treatment and control communities in the first follow-up round: this includes an increase in the index of the respondent's labor market outcomes of .18 standard deviations, an increase in household labor market activity of .12 standard deviations, an increase in the consumption and assets indices of between .1 and .2 standard deviations, and an increase in the financial inclusion index of .18 standard deviations. There is no significant increase in human capital. For secondary outcomes, there are similarly positive effects on civic engagement, psychological well-being, and women's empowerment and agency; however, there is no evidence of any effects on coping mechanisms or social cohesion. (As described in more detail below, the variables related to women's empowerment and agency relate to the level of economic empowerment of the principal woman in the household: either the individual sampled for treatment, if the treated individual is female, or his spouse, if the treated individual is male.)

It is clear in the figure, however, that these effects have substantially attenuated in the second round and are no longer statistically different from zero. We can see in Table 4 that in the second round, we observe an increase in consumption of .1 standard deviations that is not statistically significant when corrected for multiple hypothesis testing; and an increase in assets of .15 standard deviations that remains statistically significant. None of the other coefficients in round two are significant. Though in some cases the width of the confidence intervals does not allow us to reject the hypothesis that the effects are equal in magnitude across the two follow-up rounds, this hypothesis can be rejected for labor market outcomes, financial inclusion, psychological well-being, and women's empowerment and agency.

Returning to Table 4, Columns (6) through (10) capture the spillover effects estimated comparing eligible but untreated individuals in treatment and control communities. Here, the coefficients for the primary and secondary outcome families are comparable

in magnitude vis-a-vis the direct treatment effects (and in some cases, slightly larger). This suggests that these individuals also benefit significantly via informal social support from treated individuals, and/or local economic spillovers of the cash payments. There is, however, no effect on women's empowerment. Unsurprisingly, given that the direct and spillover treatment effects are similar, the final set of columns capturing the within-village difference between eligible individuals who are and are not offered treatment shows coefficients that are generally small in magnitude and statistically insignificant when corrected for multiple hypothesis testing. These effects also show the same pattern of attenuation across rounds: the only statistically significant spillover effect in the second round is an increase in the asset index, and there are no significant within-village treatment effects in the second round.

Moving beyond the aggregate indices, Tables [A1](#) through Table [A22](#) report the estimated treatment effects for the individual variables in each index to unpack the mechanisms for the underlying effect. For labor market outcomes, we can observe in Table [A1](#) that engagement in short-term public works employment leads to a near-doubling of the probability that treated individuals report an income-generating activity in round one (an increase of eight percentage points, relative to a control arm mean of nine percentage points), and an increase in the number of days worked over the last month (again, a near doubling). The low base rates of any economic activity are consistent with the targeting of the intervention to an extremely economically inactive population. In round two, however, these effects have in fact reversed in sign, with treated individuals reporting a significant five percentage point decline in the probability of any income generating activity, relative to a mean of 18%; conversely, treated individuals are significantly more likely to report that they have looked for paid work (an increase of 10 percentage points, relative to a mean in the control arm of 22%). This constitutes suggestive evidence that the medium-term effects of the intervention may in fact be slightly negative for labor market outcomes — perhaps because respondents have

forgone potentially higher-return labor market experience in the private sector while engaged in the intervention, or have raised their wage expectations suboptimally high after exposure to the wage offered by the public works program — though there seems to be a positive effect on search behavior.

A similar pattern is evident for household-level labor market outcomes, capturing whether the household head (who is the same as the respondent in about 50% of cases) or any other household member reports an income-generating activity; we observe a large and positive effect in the first round that is weakly negative in the second round. In the first round, there is an increase in the probability of an income generating activity for the household head of 14 percentage points relative to the mean in the control arm of 20%, but in the second round, the estimated effect is a decline of seven percentage points, relative to a mean in the control arm of 26%.

The detailed findings on consumption and assets reported in Tables [A5](#) through [A8](#) suggest that the increase in consumption in the short run is driven primarily by more discretionary categories of expenditure such as communications, household chores, rent and housing repairs, and other services; the largest increase seems to be in housing expenses, where we observe an increase of around \$4.50 over the past week, relative to a mean in the control arm of \$11.50, for a proportional increase of 40%. In the second round, many of the coefficients on consumption categories remain positive, but they are no longer statistically significant, and the coefficient on rent expenditure has reversed in sign. For assets, there is a significant increase in reported ownership of livestock, furniture, and electronic equipment, as well as an increase in the probability of house ownership, and these coefficients are consistent across both survey rounds.

The pattern of effects over time is particularly notable for financial inclusion outcomes, where in round one we observe a very large proportional increase in savings in the treatment arm: the current stock of savings increases by \$0.93 relative to a mean of just seven cents in the control arm, increasing nearly fourteen-fold. By the second

round, however, savings is precisely zero in both arms, reducing the treatment effect to a null.¹⁰ There are no significant effects on debt or reported ownership of a bank account in either survey round.

For secondary outcomes, we can see that the substantial increase in psychological well-being in the first round is driven by a reduction in adverse feelings of loss of control and uselessness, and a substantial increase in feelings of social connectedness, as proxied by the number of people with whom the respondent would share a decision to depart the village. The increase in women's empowerment is substantially driven by a large increase in the probability that the female member of the household reports any income generating activity: the probability increases by five percentage points relative to a base probability of two, nearly quadrupling. Again, all of these effects have attenuated to zero by the second round, often inverting in sign.

We can also compare the magnitudes of the estimated effects on economic outcomes in the short run to the actual magnitude of the transfer (again, \$550 over three months). The total positive effect on monthly consumption (summing across all categories enumerated) is around \$29. If this pattern of increased consumption has been consistent over the 12 months since the conclusion of the program, that would suggest around \$360 or 80% of the value of the original transfer in increased consumption. (Of course, households have also earned additional income during this period.) The value of additional assets is challenging to assess, as no data on asset prices was collected; and the value of additional savings (though proportionally large relative to the mean of virtually zero) is minimal at zero, with no evidence of any shift in debt. In general, it seems plausible to conclude that the transfer was substantially directed toward increased consumption in the post-transfer year, a pattern that would also be consistent with the attenuation of effects in the longer-term as funds are depleted.

To sum up, there is very little evidence that a short-term cash-for-work program

¹⁰A small number of observations reporting positive savings are winsorized.

generated persistent economic or non-economic effects in this context. The short-term effects were large for both economic and non-economic outcomes and for both direct beneficiaries and eligible individuals who were not offered work but benefited from spillover effects. These initial large effects are perhaps unsurprising given that the magnitude of the cash infusion was substantial, but they did not lead to any longer-term shifts other than some increased asset ownership.

3.4 Heterogeneous effects

The pre-analysis plan specified a number of dimensions of heterogeneity analysis.¹¹ Here, we report heterogeneity with respect to participant gender, the village-level unemployment rate (as reported in the 2014 census), and the mean incidence of recent shocks in the village (as reported in the first follow-up survey). The first community-level variable captures local economic conditions more broadly; the second community-level variable captures whether the area has recently experienced a high volume of adverse shocks.

The results presented in Tables [A23](#) through [A25](#) generally suggest there is no meaningful variation in the estimated treatment effects. For heterogeneity with respect to local economic conditions, there is some weak evidence the treatment-induced increase in consumption in round one may be smaller, but this interaction effect is noisily estimated and the pattern is not observed consistently. For heterogeneity with respect to the incidence of local shocks, there may be some positive interaction with financial inclusion (and negative interaction for social participation), but again the pattern is not consistent across outcomes.

¹¹The specified dimensions were gender, pre-existing levels of wealth/affluence, geographic isolation, project type, and community-level shocks. There is insufficient variation in project type and geographic isolation to pursue this analysis.

3.5 Selection into the evaluation sample

There are two forms of potential selection into the evaluation sample that are relevant for this analysis. First, as previously noted only 76% of individuals included on the eligibility list for the employment intervention in treatment communities, and thus targeted for inclusion in the evaluation, were in fact surveyed in the first round of follow-up and entered the evaluation sample. This includes 69% of those who were eligible and not offered employment, and 79% of those who were eligible and offered employment.¹² In addition, an attrition rate of 19.6% was observed between the first and second follow-up surveys.

To explore potential selection into the sample, we estimate treatment effects in the first round using Lee bounds (for a detailed description of the methodology, see [Lee \(2009\)](#)).¹³ The results for the main outcome families are reported in [Table A26](#). The evidence suggests that the positive treatment effects for the primary economic outcomes for individuals directly randomized into treatment are robust, particularly labor market outcomes for the main respondent and the household, consumption, assets, and financial inclusion. However, the estimated treatment effects for secondary outcomes for treated individuals (civic engagement, psychological well-being, and women's empowerment) have bounds that cross zero, as do the estimated treatment effects capturing spillovers for individuals in treatment communities who were not offered employment.

To analyze the predictors of attrition from the first to the second follow-up survey round, [Table A27](#) presents evidence using the following specification. A binary variable for attrited is regressed on a (time-invariant) household covariate as measured in the

¹²99% of those who were identified as eligible in control communities were sampled, a rate that may substantially reflect the fact that the list of eligible individuals in control communities was generated only shortly prior to the follow-up survey.

¹³We cannot examine whether any covariates are predictive of inclusion in the first follow-up survey as no data is available for those who were not included.

first survey round, a treatment indicator, and the interaction between the two; the same covariates presented in the balance tests in Table 3 are employed here.

$$Attrit_{iv} = \beta_1 X_{iv} + \beta_2 T_v + \beta_3 X_{iv} \times T_v + \epsilon_{iv} \quad (3)$$

As previously noted, the base rate of attrition between the two follow-up surveys is 18%. The findings suggest that respondents who are older, female, married, have some education and are from outside the governorate are significantly less likely to attrite, suggestive of lower levels of mobility for these subpopulations, and the coefficients are large: women are 16 percentage points more likely to be successfully surveyed in the second round, and married individuals are 10 percentage points more likely to be surveyed. There is also some evidence of heterogeneity by treatment status in these patterns: treated women are even less likely to attrite, possibly because of the positive effects of the intervention (at least in the short-term). Respondents who have some labor market experience and who were born locally are also somewhat less likely to attrite in treatment communities.

In order to explore the robustness of the estimated treatment coefficients in the long-run to the observed pattern of attrition, we also estimate Lee bounds for the second-round treatment effect estimates. The results reported in Table A28 are generally consistent with those previously reported, in that only the small positive effects on consumption and assets are positive and significant.

To sum up, the evidence presented here suggests that the positive effects on primary economic outcomes for individuals directly targeted for the cash for work intervention are robust to any bias introduced by potential selection into the evaluation sample (in the first survey round) or attrition over time (in the second survey round); this includes a range of positive effects one year post-treatment, and very limited effects on assets five year post-treatment. The positive effects on non-economic outcomes for individuals

targeted for the employment treatment, and the positive spillover effects for individuals in treatment communities who are not directly offered employment, may be less robust to correction for potential bias induced by selection into the sample.

4 Conclusion

This paper provides new evidence from a multilevel randomized controlled trial about the short- and long-term effects of a cash for work project in rural Tunisia that engaged beneficiaries who had experienced a prolonged period of past unemployment in three months of work on local public works projects. The wage stipend was equivalent to around two months of household consumption expenditure, and it led to substantial short-term positive effects (around one year post-intervention) on a range of economic and social outcomes including consumption, assets, financial inclusion, civic engagement, psychological well-being, and women's empowerment. Importantly, these effects are observed not only for individuals in treatment villages who were randomly selected for an offer of employment, but also for eligible individuals in treatment villages who were randomly selected not to receive an offer of employment, suggestive of meaningful and large intravillage spillover effects.


However, there is very little evidence that these effects persist five years post-program. Other than a weakly positive effect on assets, treatment and control individuals show similar economic and social outcomes at this point, suggesting that the engagement in short-term public works labor had no meaningful effects on shifting economic trajectories in the medium-term. In particular, there is no evidence that the intervention led to any shift in labor market integration or skill acquisition five years post-treatment.

These findings add to a growing evidence base suggestive of very limited persistent effects of short-term public works employment, though these programs could still be a

useful mechanism to provide a short-term buffer against adverse shocks or to smooth consumption. Further research may usefully explore the relative effectiveness and particularly cost-effectiveness of cash for work vis-a-vis cash transfers; given the absence of evidence that public works programs are effective in building skills or increasing employability, the relative advantage of these interventions vis-a-vis simpler social safety net programs remains an open question.


Data availability statement: Replication data for this paper will be made publicly available in an appropriate repository following acceptance of the paper.

FIGURE 1: Study Design




Notes: This figure illustrates the experimental design. The 80 rural villages were first randomized into 40 treatment and control villages. Following the identification of eligible households, assignment to the cash-for-work programs was randomized in treatment villages.

FIGURE 2: Timeline



Notes: This figure captures the evaluation timeline.

FIGURE 3: Main results



Notes: This figure reports the treatment effects for the primary and secondary outcome families in the first follow-up survey round (one year post-treatment) and second follow-up survey round (five years post-treatment). We report the primary treatment effect estimate comparing across treated individuals offered employment in treatment villages and untreated individuals in control villages, corresponding to the coefficients reported in Columns (1) through (5) of Table 4. The bars capture 95% confidence intervals; these intervals are constructed using standard errors that are not corrected for multiple hypothesis testing.

TABLE 1: Primary families of outcomes

Outcome Family		Indicators
Labor market: main respondent	Primary	Any income-generating activity (IGA) (past 4 weeks) Number of days worked in main IGA (past 4 weeks) Active employment search (past 4 weeks)
Labor market: other household members	Primary	Any IGA for household head (past 4 weeks) Any IGA for any other member of the household (past 4 weeks)
Consumption	Primary	Value of past-month household consumption in categories: meat and fish; fruit and legumes / vegetables; eggs and milk; oil and fat; beverages; cigarettes and alcohol; other food; healthcare; education; leisure; transportation; electricity / gas / water; communications; household chores; rent/small repairs; other services
Assets	Primary	Binary variables for household ownership of any mode of transportation; livestock; furniture; electronic equipment; cement or brick wall; cement or tile roof; home; land; also, self-reports three or higher on poverty scale
Financial inclusion	Primary	Amount of savings (past year) Binary variable for any debt (past year) Current debt balance Reports any bank account
Human capital	Primary	Received formal training in a trade Reports skills would like to use in the future

Notes: This table summarizes the variables included in each primary outcome family. For consumption, the survey collected data about food consumption over the past week and non-food consumption over the past month, but both are converted to monthly aggregates for the purposes of analysis. For the financial inclusion index, the variable capturing access to a bank account was reported only in the second follow-up round.

TABLE 2: Secondary families of outcomes

Outcome Family		Indicators
Coping mechanisms (in response to shock)	Secondary	Reduced food consumption Borrowed money from friends, neighbors or cooperatives Received assistance from friends, community, NGO, or government Drew down assets or savings
Social cohesion	Secondary	Community participation and cohesion Collective action Violent conflict inside/outside imada (inverted)
Civic engagement	Secondary	Civic engagement Political knowledge and attitudes Political inclusion
Psychological well being	Secondary	Fear of losing control (inverted) Fear of being exploited (inverted) Feeling of uselessness for others (inverted) Positive relationships between household members Would share with others decision to leave the village Feels accepted within family Feels accepted by other households Feels in control Feels that goals can be accomplished
Women's empowerment and agency	Secondary	Woman reports any earned income over past six months Woman decides how income will be used Man decides alone how income will be used (inverted) Woman reports income generating activity

Notes: This table summarizes the variables included in each secondary outcome family. For the psychological well being index, there were some minor differences in the variables reported across the two follow-up survey rounds. In round two, four variables are not reported: fear of being exploited, a feeling of uselessness for others, a feeling of acceptance within the household, and a feeling of acceptance by other households. The first two variables linked to self-esteem / depression are replaced by two others: a binary variable for feeling depressed, and a binary variable for loss of interest in activities.

TABLE 3: Balance across treatment and control arms

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
			Control mean	P-Value	N
Panel A: Balance in village-level covariates (2014 census)					
Number of households			1081.475 (893.523)	0.211	80
Average household size			3.864 (0.294)	0.734	80
Percentage of males aged 18 years old and above			0.555 (0.024)	0.337	80
Percentage of females aged 18 years old and above			0.384 (0.020)	0.549	80
Percentage of males aged 14-30 years old			0.129 (0.014)	0.831	80
Percentage of females aged 14-30 years old			0.132 (0.019)	0.639	80
Unemployment rate (age 15 and above) ;			.266 (.119)	0.734	80
Illiteracy rate (age 10 and above)			.397 (.139)	0.936	80
Percentage of household heads: no education			530 (.192)	0.723	80
Percentage of household heads: primary educ.			.292 (.951)	0.258	80
Percentage of household heads: secondary or higher educ.			.178 (.143)	0.143	80
Panel B: Balance in time-invariant household covariates (reported in round one, 2016)					
	Treatment villages Treated Mean (1)	Treatment villages Untreated Mean (2)	Control villages Mean (3)	Joint test P-value (4)	N (5)
Age	41.472 (10.671)	40.77 (11.767)	41.522 (11.419)	0.320	2718
Female	0.550 (0.498)	0.55 (0.497)	0.4977 (0.500)	0.983	2718
Married	0.703 (0.457)	0.647 (0.478)	0.691 (0.463)	0.110	2718
No education	0.617 (0.486)	0.592 (0.492)	0.600 (0.490)	0.617	2718
Worked more than three months in 2013	0.084 (0.278)	0.072 (0.258)	0.057 (0.233)	0.245	2718
Born in the village	0.858 (0.349)	0.826 (0.379)	0.861 (0.346)	0.266	2718
Born outside the governorate	0.113 (0.316)	0.142 (0.350)	0.111 (0.315)	0.224	2718

Notes: In Panel A, each row reports the mean of the stated variable as measured in the 2014 census in villages in the control arm, and the p-value from a regression in which the covariate is regressed on a binary treatment variable. In Panel B, each row reports the mean of a time-invariant household covariate measured in the first follow-up survey for households in the specified arm; the p-value reported is derived from a regression in which the covariate is regressed on a binary variable for village treatment and a binary variable for household treatment, and corresponds to a joint test across both treatment variables. All specifications use strata fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the village level.

***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

TABLE 4: Estimated treatment effects

	Across villages					Spillovers					Within villages				
	(1) T-C	(2) SE	(3) p-value (FDR-adj)	(4) N	(5) R2=R1 (FDR-adj)	(6) T-C	(7) SE	(8) p-value (FDR-adj)	(9) N	(10) R2=R1 (FDR-adj)	(11) T-C	(12) SE	(13) p-value (FDR-adj)	(14) N	(15) R2=R1 (FDR-adj)
Panel A: Tunisia Round 1															
<i>Primary Outcomes</i>															
Labor market of the main respondent	0.183***	0.059	0.003 (0.006)	2126		0.207***	0.053	0.000 (0.002)	1386		0.011	0.030	0.716 (0.876)	1924	
Labor market of the household	0.127***	0.041	0.003 (0.006)	2124		0.154***	0.037	0.000 (0.002)	1385		-0.010	0.025	0.681 (0.876)	1921	
Consumption	0.081**	0.039	0.040 (0.055)	2126		0.073	0.045	0.108 (0.198)	1386		0.003	0.020	0.876 (0.876)	1924	
Assets	0.178***	0.047	0.000 (0.002)	2126		0.150***	0.052	0.005 (0.014)	1386		0.016	0.024	0.501 (0.876)	1924	
Financial inclusion	0.178**	0.072	0.016 (0.026)	2126		0.050	0.064	0.441 (0.632)	1386		0.057*	0.034	0.099 (0.533)	1924	
Human capital	0.069	0.060	0.252 (0.308)	2126		0.013	0.070	0.854 (0.922)	1386		0.035	0.041	0.393 (0.866)	1924	
<i>Secondary Outcomes</i>															
Coping mechanisms	0.010	0.054	0.847 (0.848)	467		-0.035	0.059	0.551 (0.673)	251		0.063	0.048	0.194 (0.533)	462	
Social cohesion	0.022	0.037	0.554 (0.610)	2126		-0.004	0.037	0.921 (0.922)	1386		0.045	0.034	0.186 (0.533)	1924	
Civic engagement	0.175***	0.060	0.005 (0.010)	2126		0.189***	0.067	0.006 (0.014)	1386		0.006	0.031	0.849 (0.876)	1924	
Psychological well being	0.110***	0.029	0.000 (0.002)	2125		0.125***	0.033	0.000 (0.002)	1386		-0.007	0.021	0.741 (0.876)	1923	
Women's empowerment and agency	0.109***	0.035	0.003 (0.006)	1162		0.035	0.047	0.459 (0.632)	723		0.055*	0.031	0.078 (0.533)	1015	
Panel B: Tunisia Round 2															
<i>Primary Outcomes</i>															
Labor market of the main respondent	-0.019	0.043	0.662 (0.924)	1748		0.006	0.047	0.896 (0.896)	1131		-0.029	0.040	0.464 (0.936)	1491	
Labor market of the household	-0.043	0.028	0.124 (0.419)	1748		-0.027	0.030	0.366 (0.896)	1131		-0.013	0.028	0.648 (0.936)	1491	
Consumption expenditures	0.119**	0.052	0.026 (0.167)	1748		0.134**	0.058	0.023 (0.150)	1131		-0.007	0.026	0.797 (0.957)	1491	
Assets	0.150***	0.040	0.000 (0.005)	1748		0.135***	0.041	0.002 (0.021)	1131		0.001	0.025	0.956 (0.957)	1491	
Financial inclusion	0.002	0.036	0.956 (1.000)	1748		0.007	0.038	0.852 (0.896)	1131		0.003	0.031	0.915 (0.957)	1491	
Human capital	0.081	0.060	0.181 (0.472)	1748		0.035	0.062	0.572 (0.896)	1131		0.035	0.041	0.393 (0.936)	1491	
<i>Secondary Outcomes</i>															
Coping mechanisms	0.000	0.063	1.000 (1.000)	438		-0.028	0.075	0.705 (0.896)	253		0.026	0.056	0.638 (0.936)	397	
Social cohesion	0.037	0.072	0.604 (0.929)	1748		0.022	0.069	0.754 (0.896)	1131		0.026	0.039	0.508 (0.936)	1491	
Civic engagement	0.080	0.052	0.129 (0.419)	1748		0.046	0.055	0.402 (0.896)	1131		0.024	0.034	0.477 (0.936)	1491	
Psychological well being	0.013	0.032	0.691 (0.929)	1748		0.027	0.034	0.442 (0.896)	1131		-0.013	0.021	0.539 (0.936)	1491	
Women's empowerment and agency	-0.046	0.049	0.359 (0.778)	1074		-0.012	0.055	0.834 (0.896)	655		-0.027	0.047	0.565 (0.936)	951	

Notes: The table presents the primary treatment effects for the outcomes of interest, for the between-village comparison of eligible treated individuals vis-a-vis control village individuals; the spillover comparison of eligible untreated individuals vis-a-vis control arm individuals; and the within-village comparison of eligible treated and untreated individuals. All specifications include strata fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the village level. FDR q-values are calculated according to [Anderson \(2008\)](#). The columns denoted R2=R1 reports the p-values corresponding to tests of equality for the estimated coefficients for the same outcomes comparing across rounds. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

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Appendix A Outcome families reported

In this section, we provide a brief overview of any differences in the outcome families analyzed vis-a-vis the pre-analysis plan that was pre-registered, and as relevant, also note any differences in outcome variables comparing across the first and second follow-up survey rounds. It is important to note that the original PAP also specified that any outcome variable for which 95% or more of the sample provided the same response would be excluded from the analysis, a rule that has been consistently employed here.

Two outcome families included in the originally registered PAP were completely dropped as it was subsequently identified that there was no plausible channel for the intervention to target those outcomes: shocks, and access to basic services. Provision of public works employment would not alter households' exposure to economic and non-economic shocks (though it might alter their response to those shocks, as captured in the variables linked to coping mechanisms), and similarly would not alter their access to health or education services. In addition, one outcome family (intimate partner violence) is omitted from this analysis as it will be reported in a separate paper.

For labor market outcomes, there were five potentially relevant outcome families originally described in the pre-analysis plan (wage employment, other employment, non-agricultural enterprise, other farming activities, and employment and income by other household members). Two of these pre-specified outcome families had insufficient variation to be analyzed (other employment, and non-agricultural enterprise), and the detailed module on farming activities was collected only in the second follow-up survey round. Accordingly, for concision we have collapsed these to two outcome families: respondent labor market outcomes and household labor market outcomes. We also report only the binary variables, rather than the binary and continuous variables.

For consumption, food and non-food consumption have been combined, and there are no other differences vis-a-vis the pre-analysis plan. For assets, there are no difference vis-a-vis the pre-analysis plan. For financial inclusion, this outcome family was originally named debt and savings index. Two of the pre-specified variables (saved money in the last 3 months, and total amount of savings) were combined into a slightly different question (total money saved over the last 12 months). Two additional questions around debt were added (contracted any debt over the last 12 months, and amount of debt over the last 2 months).

For human capital, two variables from the originally specified set of outcomes were omitted because there was no plausible channel for the intervention to target

these outcomes: literacy of the main respondent, and education level of the main respondent. Given the age of the respondents, they had plausibly completed their educational trajectory considerably prior to the intervention launch.

For coping mechanisms, there are no differences vis-a-vis the pre-analysis plan other than that some mechanisms were aggregated up to generate seven variables instead of five. For social cohesion, the only difference vis-a-vis the pre-analysis plan is that migration has been excluded, to be reported in a separate paper; inter-personal trust has also been more appropriately re-named violent conflict. For civic engagement, there are no difference vis-a-vis the pre-analysis plan, but “political isolation” has been more appropriately renamed “political inclusion.”

For psychological well-being, there are no differences vis-a-vis the pre-analysis plan in round one. In round two, four variables are not reported: fear of being exploited, a feeling of uselessness for others, a feeling of acceptance within the household, and a feeling of acceptance by other households. The first two variables linked to self-esteem / depression are replaced by two others: a binary variable for feeling depressed, and a binary variable for loss of interest in activities.

For women’s empowerment and agency, four of the seven variables are reported; the remaining three had an insufficient level of variation.

The designation of primary and secondary outcome families is consistent with the PAP, except that the coping mechanisms outcomes are re-designated as secondary.

FIGURE A1: Study Locations




FIGURE A1: Timeline of the projects




TABLE A1: Estimated treatment effects: respondent labor market outcomes (round one)

	Between					Spillovers					Within				
	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N
Any income-generating activity (IGA) (past 4 weeks)	0.091	0.079***	0.025	0.002	2123	0.091	0.096***	0.022	0.000	1384	0.178	-0.015	0.019	0.428	1921
				(0.007)					(0.001)					(0.680)	
Number of days worked in main IGA (past 4 weeks)	1.378	1.120**	0.440	0.013	2097	1.378	1.350***	0.391	0.001	1374	2.528	-0.134	0.325	0.680	1893
				(0.020)					(0.002)					(0.680)	
Active employment search (past 4 weeks)	0.352	0.026	0.033	0.427	2125	0.352	0.015	0.041	0.717	1385	0.355	0.017	0.024	0.481	1924
				(0.428)					(0.718)					(0.680)	

Notes: This table presents regression results for labor market outcomes of the main respondent (round one). The table presents the primary treatment effects for the outcomes of interest, for the between-village comparison of eligible treated individuals vis-a-vis control village individuals; the spillover comparison of eligible untreated individuals vis-a-vis control arm individuals; and the within-village comparison of eligible treated and untreated individuals. All the specifications use strata fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the village level. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

TABLE A2: Estimated treatment effects: respondent labor market outcomes (round two)

	Between					Spillovers					Within				
	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N
Any income-generating activity (IGA) (past 4 weeks)	0.183	-0.052**	0.020	0.012	1748	0.183	-0.034	0.022	0.136	1131	0.146	-0.016	0.020	0.409	1491
				(0.018)					(0.147)					(0.614)	
Number of days worked in main IGA (past 4 weeks)	3.425	-1.101**	0.456	0.018	1744	3.425	-0.731	0.498	0.146	1128	2.714	-0.389	0.418	0.352	1490
				(0.019)					(0.147)					(0.614)	
Active employment search (past 4 weeks)	0.224	0.101***	0.035	0.005	1484	0.224	0.095**	0.038	0.015	940	0.308	0.005	0.028	0.871	1290
				(0.017)					(0.046)					(0.871)	

Notes: This table presents regression results for labor market outcomes of the main respondent (round two). The table presents the primary treatment effects for the outcomes of interest, for the between-village comparison of eligible treated individuals vis-a-vis control village individuals; the spillover comparison of eligible untreated individuals vis-a-vis control arm individuals; and the within-village comparison of eligible treated and untreated individuals. All the specifications use strata fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the village level. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

TABLE A3: Estimated treatment effects: household labor market outcomes (round one)

	Between					Spillovers					Within				
	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N
Any IGA for household head (past 4 weeks)	0.201	0.136**	0.051	0.010	682	0.201	0.125***	0.045	0.007	469	0.305	0.012	0.039	0.752	633
				(0.013)					(0.007)					(0.752)	
Any IGA for any other member of the household (past 4 weeks)	0.036	0.038**	0.015	0.013	1442	0.036	0.057***	0.017	0.001	916	0.089	-0.018	0.017	0.275	1288
				(0.013)					(0.003)					(0.551)	

Notes: This table presents regression results for labor market outcomes of the household (round one). The table presents the primary treatment effects for the outcomes of interest, for the between-village comparison of eligible treated individuals vis-a-vis control village individuals; the spillover comparison of eligible untreated individuals vis-a-vis control arm individuals; and the within-village comparison of eligible treated and untreated individuals. All the specifications use strata fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the village level. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

TABLE A4: Estimated treatment effects: household labor market outcomes (round two)

	Between					Spillovers					Within				
	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N
Any IGA for household head (past 4 weeks)	0.256	-0.066**	0.032	0.044	808	0.256	-0.020	0.037	0.586	559	0.234	-0.039	0.036	0.275	633
				(0.089)					(0.586)					(0.551)	
Any IGA for any other member of the household (past 4 weeks)	0.101	-0.011	0.022	0.607	940	0.101	-0.018	0.025	0.478	572	0.078	0.007	0.020	0.744	858
				(0.607)					(0.586)					(0.744)	

Notes: This table presents regression results for labor market outcomes of the household (round two). The table presents the primary treatment effects for the outcomes of interest, for the between-village comparison of eligible treated individuals vis-a-vis control village individuals; the spillover comparison of eligible untreated individuals vis-a-vis control arm individuals; and the within-village comparison of eligible treated and untreated individuals. All the specifications use strata fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the village level. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

TABLE A5: Estimated treatment effects: consumption (round one)

	Between					Spillovers					Within				
	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N
Value of meat and fish consumed	3.978	-0.405	0.516	0.434	2126	3.978	-0.621	0.590	0.295	1386	3.391	0.218	0.348	0.532	1924
				(0.497)					(0.606)					(0.608)	
Value of fruit and legumes/vegetables consumed	10.932	1.454	1.165	0.216	2126	10.932	4.910***	1.507	0.002	1386	16.228	-3.376***	0.709	0.000	1924
				(0.314)					(0.027)					(0.001)	
Value of egg and milk consumed	2.145	0.897**	0.362	0.015	2126	2.145	0.635	0.392	0.109	1386	2.774	0.241	0.223	0.280	1924
				(0.104)					(0.422)					(0.374)	
Value of oil and fat consumed	1.722	0.292	0.209	0.166	2126	1.722	0.113	0.275	0.682	1386	1.838	0.203	0.144	0.158	1924
				(0.285)					(0.893)					(0.254)	
Value of beverages consumed	0.724	0.043	0.168	0.800	2126	0.724	-0.095	0.176	0.591	1386	0.649	0.138	0.093	0.139	1924
				(0.854)					(0.860)					(0.253)	
Value of cigarette and alcohol consumed	5.259	0.789	0.829	0.345	2126	5.259	1.742*	0.994	0.084	1386	7.001	-0.963*	0.550	0.080	1924
				(0.460)					(0.422)					(0.253)	
Value of other food consumed	12.782	5.134***	1.142	0.000	2126	12.782	3.838***	1.370	0.006	1386	16.217	1.535*	0.872	0.079	1924
				(0.001)					(0.052)					(0.253)	
Expenditure on healthcare	49.571	-6.953*	3.854	0.075	1829	49.571	-0.835	4.458	0.852	1200	50.008	-6.974**	3.035	0.022	1607
				(0.172)					(0.904)					(0.116)	
Expenditure on education	18.214	1.570	1.809	0.388	1899	18.214	-0.202	1.672	0.904	1261	17.666	1.882	1.280	0.142	1696
				(0.478)					(0.904)					(0.253)	
Expenditure on leisure	10.567	-0.211	1.919	0.913	1757	10.567	0.642	2.142	0.765	1208	11.704	-0.849	1.072	0.428	1557
				(0.913)					(0.893)					(0.527)	
Expenditure on transportation	30.393	5.296	3.604	0.146	1806	30.393	5.244	3.442	0.132	1209	35.876	0.566	1.980	0.775	1573
				(0.285)					(0.422)					(0.775)	
Expenditure on electricity, gas, water,	68.508	7.435	5.470	0.178	1963	68.508	-1.749	6.272	0.781	1294	67.106	8.590**	3.518	0.015	1761
				(0.285)					(0.893)					(0.116)	
Expenditure on communication	10.208	2.419*	1.311	0.069	1829	10.208	2.135	1.683	0.208	1216	12.608	0.273	0.899	0.761	1595
				(0.172)					(0.556)					(0.775)	
Expenditure on household chores	10.891	1.956*	1.055	0.068	1615	10.891	0.987	1.234	0.426	1078	12.173	1.009	0.841	0.230	1395
				(0)					(0)					(0)	
Expenditure on rent and/or housing repairs	11.536	4.503**	2.030	0.029	1697	11.536	2.379	2.516	0.347	1145	13.600	2.569	1.706	0.132	1496
				(0)					(0)					(0)	
Expenditure on other services	21.677	4.980**	2.087	0.019	1452	21.677	2.758	2.658	0.303	1002	24.708	2.419	1.525	0.113	1244
				(0)					(0)					(0)	

Notes: This table presents regression results for consumption outcomes (round one). The table presents the primary treatment effects for the outcomes of interest, for the between-village comparison of eligible treated individuals vis-a-vis control village individuals; the spillover comparison of eligible untreated individuals vis-a-vis control arm individuals; and the within-village comparison of eligible treated and untreated individuals. All the specifications use strata fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the village level. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

TABLE A6: Estimated treatment effects: consumption (round two)

	Between					Spillovers					Within				
	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N
Value of meat and fish consumed	22.091	2.576	1.749	0.145	1672	22.091	3.228	1.969	0.105	1069	25.015	-0.624	1.082	0.564	1439
				(0.356)	1740	2.846	1.513*	0.781	0.056	1120	4.329	-0.721	0.451	0.110	1486
Value of fruit consumed	2.846	0.772	0.617	0.215	1740	2.846	1.513*	0.781	0.056	1120	4.329	-0.721	0.451	0.110	1486
				(0.356)	1740				(0.241)					(0.858)	
Value of milk products consumed	8.679	0.907	0.896	0.315	1695	8.679	1.345	1.005	0.185	1083	9.868	-0.387	0.635	0.542	1464
				(0.420)	1741	2.200	1.588*	0.808	0.053	1121	3.688	-0.540	0.450	0.230	1484
Value of oil consumed	2.200	0.944	0.661	0.158	1741	2.200	1.588*	0.808	0.053	1121	3.688	-0.540	0.450	0.230	1484
				(0.356)	1741				(0.241)					(0.858)	
Value of beverages consumed	2.200	0.517	0.631	0.415	1740	2.200	0.665	0.680	0.331	1126	2.760	-0.164	0.414	0.693	1486
				(0.512)	1740				(0.442)					(0.858)	
Value of cigarette consumed	0.865	1.161	0.787	0.144	1747	0.865	1.707*	0.960	0.079	1130	2.468	-0.535	0.519	0.303	1491
				(0.356)	1747				(0.241)					(0.858)	
Value of other food consumed	24.371	6.707**	3.053	0.031	1665	24.371	4.593	2.975	0.127	1068	28.902	1.973	1.877	0.293	1435
				(0.248)	1741				(0.254)					(0.858)	
Expenditure on healthcare	71.831	7.965	6.472	0.222	1740	71.831	9.792	7.275	0.182	1124	82.289	-2.042	5.455	0.708	1486
				(0.356)	1741	38.628	1.621	3.375	0.632	1122	40.600	2.200	3.203	0.492	1487
Expenditure on education	38.628	3.542	3.246	0.279	1741	38.628	1.621	3.375	0.632	1122	40.600	2.200	3.203	0.492	1487
				(0.406)	1741				(0.633)					(0.858)	
Expenditure on leisure	3.778	2.331	1.789	0.197	1748	3.778	3.087	1.874	0.103	1131	6.532	-0.837	0.871	0.337	1491
				(0.356)	1748				(0.241)					(0.858)	
Expenditure on transportation	38.528	4.361	2.815	0.125	1744	38.528	5.354*	3.010	0.079	1125	43.370	-0.196	2.439	0.936	1485
				(0.356)	1744				(0.241)					(0.936)	
Expenditure on electricity, gas, water	75.884	5.452	8.572	0.527	1746	75.884	-5.381	8.604	0.533	1127	70.782	9.352**	4.748	0.049	1489
				(0.562)	1746				(0.610)					(0.786)	
Expenditure on communication	13.999	5.054***	1.673	0.003	1747	13.999	4.431**	1.917	0.023	1130	17.809	0.736	1.113	0.509	1491
				(0.055)	1747				(0.241)					(0.858)	
Expenditure on household chores	16.866	1.900*	1.137	0.099	1742	16.866	1.651	1.303	0.209	1125	18.508	0.218	0.879	0.804	1487
				0	1742				0					0	
Expenditure on rent and/or housing repairs	12.048	-2.038	3.012	0.501	1294	12.048	-3.490	3.785	0.359	818	7.547	1.262	2.770	0.649	1116
				0	1294				0					0	
Expenditure on other services	0.323	0.012	0.085	0.883	1748	0.323	0.051	0.099	0.605	1131	0.324	-0.018	0.072	0.797	1491
				0	1748				0					0	

Notes: This table presents regression results for consumption outcomes (round two). The table presents the primary treatment effects for the outcomes of interest, for the between-village comparison of eligible treated individuals vis-a-vis control village individuals; the spillover comparison of eligible untreated individuals vis-a-vis control arm individuals; and the within-village comparison of eligible treated and untreated individuals. All the specifications use strata fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the village level. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

TABLE A7: Estimated treatment effects: assets (round one)

	Between					Spillovers					Within				
	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N
Any mode of transportation	0.030	0.026**	0.011	0.018	2126	0.030	0.013	0.012	0.299	1386	0.041	0.012	0.010	0.228	1924
				(0.053)					(0.385)					(0.343)	
Livestock	2.797	1.004*	0.520	0.057	2126	2.797	0.737	0.518	0.159	1386	3.417	0.354	0.239	0.138	1924
				(0.086)					(0.239)					(0.249)	
Furniture	5.780	0.593**	0.291	0.045	2126	5.780	0.889***	0.291	0.003	1386	6.581	-0.272**	0.137	0.048	1924
				(0.082)					(0.014)					(0.108)	
Electronic equipment	3.112	0.334**	0.150	0.029	2126	3.112	0.371**	0.160	0.023	1386	3.461	-0.059	0.080	0.458	1924
				(0.065)					(0.070)					(0.516)	
Cement or brick wall	0.838	0.016	0.028	0.570	2123	0.838	0.022	0.029	0.459	1382	0.871	-0.010	0.017	0.559	1923
				(0.571)					(0.516)					(0.560)	
Cement or tile roof	0.913	0.016	0.019	0.401	2121	0.913	0.035*	0.020	0.075	1382	0.951	-0.023**	0.011	0.045	1919
				(0.451)					(0.164)					(0.108)	
Home ownership	0.706	0.076**	0.030	0.015	2125	0.706	0.063*	0.037	0.091	1385	0.767	0.019	0.021	0.358	1924
				(0.053)					(0.164)					(0.461)	
Land ownership	0.122	0.053	0.038	0.164	2110	0.122	0.003	0.033	0.928	1380	0.126	0.054***	0.017	0.002	1904
				(0.211)					(0.929)					(0.018)	
Three or more on the imada poverty scale	0.055	0.121***	0.024	0.000	2126	0.055	0.076***	0.024	0.002	1386	0.127	0.040**	0.017	0.019	1924
				(0.001)					(0.014)					(0.088)	

Notes: This table presents regression results for assets outcomes (round one). The table presents the primary treatment effects for the outcomes of interest, for the between-village comparison of eligible treated individuals vis-a-vis control village individuals; the spillover comparison of eligible untreated individuals vis-a-vis control arm individuals; and the within-village comparison of eligible treated and untreated individuals. All the specifications use strata fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the village level. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

TABLE A8: Estimated treatment effects: assets (round two)

	Between					Spillovers					Within				
	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N
Any mode of transportation	0.063	0.003	0.019	0.883	1748	0.063	0.002	0.018	0.905	1131	0.066	-0.003	0.014	0.811	1491
				(0.884)					(0.905)					(0.912)	
Livestock	5.648	0.476	0.697	0.497	1748	5.648	1.022	0.788	0.198	1131	6.510	-0.515	0.392	0.189	1491
				(0.746)					(0.298)					(0.426)	
Furniture	13.146	1.121*	0.615	0.072	1748	13.146	1.173*	0.640	0.071	1131	14.039	-0.086	0.326	0.791	1491
				(0.163)					(0.131)					(0.912)	
Electronic equipment	4.510	0.447**	0.182	0.016	1748	4.510	0.525***	0.195	0.009	1131	4.966	-0.078	0.122	0.522	1491
				(0.050)					(0.040)					(0.784)	
Cement or brick wall	0.842	0.012	0.029	0.672	1746	0.842	0.008	0.031	0.807	1128	0.862	0.001	0.020	0.973	1490
				(0.865)					(0.905)					(0.973)	
Cement or tile roof	0.921	0.004	0.020	0.827	1745	0.921	0.034*	0.019	0.073	1128	0.956	-0.033**	0.013	0.010	1487
				(0.884)					(0.131)					(0.091)	
Home ownership	0.706	0.103***	0.031	0.002	1748	0.706	0.080**	0.035	0.025	1131	0.785	0.023	0.023	0.315	1491
				(0.008)					(0.077)					(0.567)	
Land ownership	0.056	0.016	0.021	0.446	1748	0.056	-0.010	0.020	0.628	1131	0.043	0.027**	0.013	0.034	1491
				(0.746)					(0.808)					(0.115)	
Three or more on the imada poverty scale	0.058	0.124***	0.027	0.000	1748	0.058	0.079***	0.025	0.002	1131	0.130	0.041**	0.020	0.038	1491
				(0.001)					(0.021)					(0.115)	

Notes: This table presents regression results for assets outcomes (round two). The table presents the primary treatment effects for the outcomes of interest, for the between-village comparison of eligible treated individuals vis-a-vis control village individuals; the spillover comparison of eligible untreated individuals vis-a-vis control arm individuals; and the within-village comparison of eligible treated and untreated individuals. All the specifications use strata fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the village level. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

TABLE A9: Estimated treatment effects: financial inclusion (round one)

	Between					Spillovers					Within				
	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N
Amount of savings (past year)	0.069	0.932***	0.311	0.004	2120	0.069	0.456**	0.218	0.040	1383	0.482	0.399	0.276	0.149	1915
				(0.012)					(0.119)					(0.224)	
Binary variable for any debt (past year)	0.519	0.054	0.039	0.172	2114	0.519	-0.017	0.044	0.710	1376	0.512	0.068***	0.025	0.006	1910
				(0.259)					(0.711)					(0.018)	
Current debt balance	118.045	-5.039	13.047	0.700	2055	118.045	-6.532	13.609	0.633	1342	111.141	4.658	9.600	0.628	1859
				(0.701)					(0.711)					(0.628)	

Notes: This table presents regression results for financial inclusion outcomes (round one). The table presents the primary treatment effects for the outcomes of interest, for the between-village comparison of eligible treated individuals vis-a-vis control village individuals; the spillover comparison of eligible untreated individuals vis-a-vis control arm individuals; and the within-village comparison of eligible treated and untreated individuals. All the specifications use strata fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the village level. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10

TABLE A10: Estimated treatment effects: financial inclusion (round two)

	Between					Spillovers					Within				
	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N
Amount of savings (past year)	0.000	0.000	0.000	.	1748	0.000	0.000	0.000	.	1131	0.000	0.000	0.000	.	1491
				(.)					(.)					(.)	
Binary variable for any debt (past year)	0.380	-0.018	0.029	0.524	1699	0.380	0.020	0.032	0.537	1098	0.406	-0.038	0.028	0.172	1459
				(0.793)					(0.724)					(0.282)	
Current debt balance	527.629	22.691	86.070	0.793	1698	527.629	-69.672	88.654	0.434	1097	476.435	87.144	66.087	0.188	1457
				(0.793)					(0.724)					(0.282)	
Reports any bank account	0.107	0.009	0.030	0.769	1748	0.107	0.012	0.034	0.723	1131	0.108	0.002	0.018	0.889	1491
				(0.793)					(0.724)					(0.889)	

Notes: This table presents regression results for financial inclusion outcomes (round two). The table presents the primary treatment effects for the outcomes of interest, for the between-village comparison of eligible treated individuals vis-a-vis control village individuals; the spillover comparison of eligible untreated individuals vis-a-vis control arm individuals; and the within-village comparison of eligible treated and untreated individuals. All the specifications use strata fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the village level. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10

TABLE A11: Estimated treatment effects: human capital (round one)

	Between					Spillovers					Within				
	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N
Received training in a trade	0.116	0.035	0.024	0.159	2124	0.116	0.003	0.025	0.919	1386	0.110	0.031**	0.016	0.049	1922
				(0.319)					(0.920)					(0.099)	
Has skills would like to use	0.270	0.015	0.032	0.634	2097	0.270	0.013	0.042	0.766	1379	0.288	-0.001	0.022	0.956	1898
				(0.635)					(0.920)					(0.956)	

Notes: This table presents regression results for human capital outcomes (round one). The table presents the primary treatment effects for the outcomes of interest, for the between-village comparison of eligible treated individuals vis-a-vis control village individuals; the spillover comparison of eligible untreated individuals vis-a-vis control arm individuals; and the within-village comparison of eligible treated and untreated individuals. All the specifications use strata fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the village level. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10

TABLE A12: Estimated treatment effects: human capital (round two)

	Between					Spillovers					Within				
	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N
Received training in a trade	0.042	0.007	0.013	0.613	1748	0.042	-0.004	0.016	0.825	1131	0.039	0.009	0.011	0.442	1491
				(0.613)					(0.826)					(0.655)	
Has skills would like to use	0.019	0.018	0.012	0.156	1748	0.019	0.012	0.012	0.313	1131	0.027	0.004	0.009	0.655	1491
				(0.312)					(0.627)					(0.655)	

Notes: This table presents regression results for human capital outcomes (round two). The table presents the primary treatment effects for the outcomes of interest, for the between-village comparison of eligible treated individuals vis-a-vis control village individuals; the spillover comparison of eligible untreated individuals vis-a-vis control arm individuals; and the within-village comparison of eligible treated and untreated individuals. All the specifications use strata fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the village level. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10

TABLE A13: Estimated treatment effects: coping mechanisms (round one)

	Between					Spillovers					Within				
	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N
Reduced food consumption	0.078	0.031	0.027	0.247 (0.808)	467	0.078	0.010	0.034	0.773 (0.921)	251	0.098	0.020	0.032	0.528 (0.574)	462
Borrowed money	0.672	0.019	0.051	0.717 (0.808)	467	0.672	-0.027	0.060	0.655 (0.921)	251	0.642	0.058	0.050	0.251 (0.574)	462
Received assistance	0.141	0.010	0.042	0.808 (0.808)	467	0.141	-0.005	0.046	0.921 (0.921)	251	0.122	0.020	0.035	0.573 (0.574)	462
Drew down assets or savings	0.148	-0.023	0.047	0.629 (0.808)	467	0.148	0.012	0.053	0.823 (0.921)	251	0.154	-0.033	0.037	0.373 (0.574)	462

Notes: This table presents regression results for coping mechanisms outcomes (round one). The table presents the primary treatment effects for the outcomes of interest, for the between-village comparison of eligible treated individuals vis-a-vis control village individuals; the spillover comparison of eligible untreated individuals vis-a-vis control arm individuals; and the within-village comparison of eligible treated and untreated individuals. All the specifications use strata fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the village level. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

TABLE A14: Estimated treatment effects: coping mechanisms (round two)

	Between					Spillovers					Within				
	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N
Reduced food consumption	0.299	0.094	0.064	0.143 (0.571)	438	0.299	0.047	0.077	0.545 (0.984)	253	0.340	0.051	0.054	0.345 (0.557)	397
Borrowed money	0.401	0.023	0.064	0.716 (0.716)	438	0.401	0.024	0.075	0.745 (0.984)	253	0.425	0.002	0.056	0.978 (0.979)	397
Received assistance	0.122	0.030	0.031	0.336 (0.673)	438	0.122	0.001	0.040	0.984 (0.984)	253	0.123	0.031	0.038	0.417 (0.557)	397
Drew down assets or savings	0.122	-0.022	0.039	0.575 (0.716)	438	0.122	0.021	0.043	0.626 (0.984)	253	0.142	-0.041	0.038	0.287 (0.557)	397

Notes: This table presents regression results for coping mechanisms outcomes (round two). The table presents the primary treatment effects for the outcomes of interest, for the between-village comparison of eligible treated individuals vis-a-vis control village individuals; the spillover comparison of eligible untreated individuals vis-a-vis control arm individuals; and the within-village comparison of eligible treated and untreated individuals. All the specifications use strata fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the village level. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

TABLE A15: Estimated treatment effects: social cohesion (round one)

	Between					Spillovers					Within				
	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N
Community participation and cohesion	0.008	0.008	0.005	0.138 (0.208)	2126	0.008	-0.003	0.004	0.358 (0.766)	1386	0.003	0.008**	0.004	0.034 (0.101)	1924
Collective action	0.035	0.017	0.017	0.314 (0.314)	2126	0.035	0.012	0.018	0.510 (0.766)	1386	0.042	0.007	0.011	0.531 (0.531)	1924
Violent conflict	0.021	0.015	0.009	0.100 (0.208)	2126	0.021	0.002	0.010	0.846 (0.846)	1386	0.025	0.013	0.009	0.167 (0.250)	1924

Notes: This table presents regression results for social cohesion outcomes (round one). The table presents the primary treatment effects for the outcomes of interest, for the between-village comparison of eligible treated individuals vis-a-vis control village individuals; the spillover comparison of eligible untreated individuals vis-a-vis control arm individuals; and the within-village comparison of eligible treated and untreated individuals. All the specifications use strata fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the village level. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

TABLE A16: Estimated treatment effects: social cohesion (round two)

	Between					Spillovers					Within				
	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N
Community participation and cohesion	0.020	0.005	0.015	0.749	1748	0.020	-0.002	0.012	0.874	1131	0.011	0.007	0.006	0.275	1491
				(0.905)					(0.980)					(0.825)	
Collective action	0.124	0.009	0.072	0.905	1748	0.124	0.002	0.071	0.979	1131	0.092	0.005	0.032	0.873	1491
				(0.905)					(0.980)					(0.944)	
Violent conflict	0.061	-0.015	0.015	0.302	1748	0.061	-0.018	0.016	0.261	1131	0.048	-0.001	0.012	0.944	1491
				(0.905)					(0.784)					(0.944)	

Notes: This table presents regression results for social cohesion outcomes (round two). The table presents the primary treatment effects for the outcomes of interest, for the between-village comparison of eligible treated individuals vis-a-vis control village individuals; the spillover comparison of eligible untreated individuals vis-a-vis control arm individuals; and the within-village comparison of eligible treated and untreated individuals. All the specifications use strata fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the village level. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10

TABLE A17: Estimated treatment effects: civic engagement (round one)

	Between					Spillovers					Within				
	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N
Civic engagement	0.242	0.087*	0.047	0.066	2126	0.242	0.075	0.052	0.153	1386	0.309	0.012	0.023	0.588	1924
				(0.100)					(0.168)					(0.627)	
Political knowledge and attitudes	1.514	0.076	0.065	0.247	2126	1.514	0.099	0.071	0.168	1386	1.590	-0.017	0.035	0.626	1924
				(0.247)					(0.168)					(0.627)	
Political inclusion	1.171	0.148***	0.054	0.007	2126	1.171	0.188***	0.058	0.002	1386	1.356	-0.043	0.031	0.165	1924
				(0.023)					(0.005)					(0.495)	

Notes: This table presents regression results for civic engagement outcomes (round one). The table presents the primary treatment effects for the outcomes of interest, for the between-village comparison of eligible treated individuals vis-a-vis control village individuals; the spillover comparison of eligible untreated individuals vis-a-vis control arm individuals; and the within-village comparison of eligible treated and untreated individuals. All the specifications use strata fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the village level. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10

TABLE A18: Estimated treatment effects: civic engagement (round two)

	Between					Spillovers					Within				
	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N
Civic engagement	0.297	0.012	0.042	0.768	1748	0.297	-0.015	0.046	0.750	1131	0.279	0.021	0.026	0.422	1491
				(0.768)					(0.750)					(0.423)	
Political knowledge and attitudes	1.012	0.111	0.072	0.128	1748	1.012	0.050	0.078	0.522	1131	1.064	0.056	0.042	0.181	1491
				(0.384)					(0.750)					(0.423)	
Political inclusion	1.176	0.037	0.061	0.539	1748	1.176	0.061	0.057	0.282	1131	1.222	-0.029	0.032	0.372	1491
				(0.768)					(0.750)					(0.423)	

Notes: This table presents regression results for civic engagement outcomes (round two). The table presents the primary treatment effects for the outcomes of interest, for the between-village comparison of eligible treated individuals vis-a-vis control village individuals; the spillover comparison of eligible untreated individuals vis-a-vis control arm individuals; and the within-village comparison of eligible treated and untreated individuals. All the specifications use strata fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the village level. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10

TABLE A19: Estimated treatment effects: psychological well-being (round one)

	Between					Spillovers					Within				
	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N
Fear of losing control (inverted)	0.548	0.098**	0.041	0.019	2103	0.548	0.061	0.051	0.236	1375	0.475	0.040	0.025	0.108	1898
				(0.057)					(0.304)					(0.190)	
Fear of being exploited (inverted)	0.515	0.036	0.042	0.394	2110	0.515	0.053	0.052	0.306	1375	0.456	-0.020	0.025	0.417	1907
				(0.591)					(0.307)					(0.506)	
Feeling of uselessness for others (inverted)	0.852	0.083***	0.028	0.004	2107	0.852	0.066**	0.033	0.049	1380	0.776	0.016	0.021	0.450	1903
				(0.019)					(0.148)					(0.506)	
Positive relationships between household members	0.554	0.072	0.054	0.190	2120	0.554	0.082	0.057	0.151	1383	0.641	-0.009	0.024	0.700	1917
				(0.343)					(0.273)					(0.701)	
Number of people with whom would share decision to leave the imada	1.096	0.429***	0.109	0.000	2045	1.096	0.206*	0.115	0.078	1324	1.277	0.235***	0.076	0.002	1891
				(0.002)					(0.176)					(0.018)	
Feels accepted within family	0.952	-0.006	0.015	0.681	2109	0.952	0.014	0.014	0.300	1376	0.964	-0.015	0.010	0.118	1915
				(0.766)					(0.307)					(0.190)	
Feels accepted by other households	0.967	-0.000	0.009	0.984	2098	0.967	0.013	0.010	0.201	1370	0.979	-0.014*	0.008	0.062	1896
				(0.985)					(0.302)					(0.187)	
Feels in control	0.694	0.013	0.031	0.670	2096	0.694	0.071**	0.033	0.037	1376	0.752	-0.055**	0.022	0.012	1898
				(0.766)					(0.148)					(0.054)	
Feels that goals can be accomplished	0.809	0.040	0.026	0.123	2108	0.809	0.073***	0.024	0.003	1377	0.869	-0.026	0.017	0.126	1903
				(0.278)					(0.025)					(0.190)	

Notes: This table presents regression results for psychological well-being outcomes (round one). The table presents the primary treatment effects for the outcomes of interest, for the between-village comparison of eligible treated individuals vis-a-vis control village individuals; the spillover comparison of eligible untreated individuals vis-a-vis control arm individuals; and the within-village comparison of eligible treated and untreated individuals. All the specifications use strata fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the village level. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10

TABLE A20: Estimated treatment effects: psychological well-being (round two)

	Between					Spillovers					Within				
	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N
Fear of losing control (inverted)	0.320	0.006	0.044	0.889	1748	0.320	0.043	0.046	0.351	1131	0.279	-0.038	0.026	0.144	1491
				(0.963)					(0.985)					(0.896)	
Feels depressed (inverted)	0.411	-0.004	0.044	0.935	1709	0.411	0.004	0.046	0.930	1110	0.401	-0.008	0.028	0.772	1457
				(0.963)					(0.985)					(0.972)	
Loss of interest for activities (inverted)	0.409	0.022	0.040	0.588	1724	0.409	0.028	0.045	0.535	1117	0.374	-0.008	0.028	0.776	1467
				(0.963)					(0.985)					(0.972)	
Positive relationships between household members	0.182	0.021	0.036	0.560	1691	0.182	0.031	0.038	0.415	1092	0.148	-0.012	0.021	0.562	1439
				(0.963)					(0.985)					(0.972)	
Number of people with whom would share decision to leave the imada	0.909	0.019	0.019	0.333	1740	0.909	0.001	0.021	0.946	1126	0.908	0.018	0.016	0.256	1486
				(0.963)					(0.985)					(0.896)	
Feels in control	0.433	-0.002	0.044	0.963	1689	0.433	-0.001	0.052	0.984	1091	0.418	0.001	0.029	0.971	1426
				(0.963)					(0.985)					(0.972)	
Feels that goals can be accomplished	0.583	-0.038	0.057	0.511	1705	0.583	-0.028	0.060	0.646	1103	0.543	-0.003	0.029	0.921	1442
				(0.963)					(0.985)					(0.972)	

Notes: This table presents regression results for psychological well-being outcomes (round two). The table presents the primary treatment effects for the outcomes of interest, for the between-village comparison of eligible treated individuals vis-a-vis control village individuals; the spillover comparison of eligible untreated individuals vis-a-vis control arm individuals; and the within-village comparison of eligible treated and untreated individuals. All the specifications use strata fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the village level. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10

TABLE A21: Estimated treatment effects: women’s empowerment and agency (round one)

	Between					Spillovers					Within				
	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N
Woman reports any earned income (past 6 months)	0.007	0.001	0.005	0.871 (0.872)	1161	0.007	0.008	0.009	0.400 (0.625)	722	0.014	-0.006	0.008	0.465 (0.465)	1013
Woman decides how income will be used	0.667	0.444	0.287	0.160 (0.320)	9	0.667	-0.235	0.300	0.468 (0.625)	7	0.500	0.600*	0.265	0.058 (0.117)	10
Man decides alone how income will be used (inverted)	0.545	-0.044	0.056	0.436 (0.582)	796	0.545	0.003	0.058	0.964 (0.965)	487	0.570	-0.043	0.039	0.270 (0.360)	751
Women reports income generating activity	0.015	0.053***	0.015	0.001 (0.003)	806	0.015	0.014	0.013	0.293 (0.625)	484	0.028	0.039**	0.016	0.011 (0.045)	754

Notes: This table presents regression results for Woman Bargaining outcomes (round one). The table presents the primary treatment effects for the outcomes of interest, for the between-village comparison of eligible treated individuals vis-a-vis control village individuals; the spillover comparison of eligible untreated individuals vis-a-vis control arm individuals; and the within-village comparison of eligible treated and untreated individuals. All the specifications use strata fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the village level. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

TABLE A22: Estimated treatment effects: women’s empowerment and agency (round two)

	Between					Spillovers					Within				
	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N	C Mean	T-C	SE	p-value	N
Woman reports any earned income (past 6 months)	0.087	-0.012	0.019	0.539 (0.720)	1074	0.087	0.002	0.023	0.945 (0.946)	655	0.079	-0.008	0.019	0.672 (0.709)	951
Woman decides how income will be used	0.154	-0.035	0.025	0.169 (0.656)	1074	0.154	-0.058**	0.026	0.026 (0.105)	655	0.090	0.022	0.021	0.311 (0.623)	951
Man decides alone how income will be used (inverted)	0.668	0.012	0.050	0.814 (0.815)	1074	0.668	0.063	0.050	0.209 (0.419)	655	0.733	-0.056*	0.032	0.084 (0.337)	951
Women reports income generating activity	0.100	-0.021	0.021	0.328 (0.656)	1074	0.100	-0.008	0.026	0.769 (0.946)	655	0.083	-0.007	0.020	0.708 (0.709)	951

Notes: This table presents regression results for women’s empowerment and agency outcomes (round two). The table presents the primary treatment effects for the outcomes of interest, for the between-village comparison of eligible treated individuals vis-a-vis control village individuals; the spillover comparison of eligible untreated individuals vis-a-vis control arm individuals; and the within-village comparison of eligible treated and untreated individuals. All the specifications use strata fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the village level. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

TABLE A23: Heterogeneous effects with respect to gender

	Between				Within					
	β	Factor	$\beta \times$ Factor	P-value	N	β	Factor	$\beta \times$ Factor	P-value	N
Panel A: Tunisia Round 1										
<i>Primary Outcomes</i>										
Labor market of the main respondent	0.184** (0.092)	-0.557*** (0.074)	-0.011 (0.091)	(0.902)	2126	0.024 (0.046)	-0.442*** (0.046)	-0.012 (0.056)	(0.836)	1924
Labor market of the household	0.144** (0.071)	-0.162*** (0.053)	-0.043 (0.071)	(0.551)	2124	-0.041 (0.042)	-0.214*** (0.039)	0.065 (0.047)	(0.169)	1921
Consumption	0.085* (0.050)	-0.058** (0.028)	0.031 (0.045)	(0.486)	2126	-0.002 (0.030)	-0.058* (0.032)	0.041 (0.039)	(0.295)	1924
Assets	0.165*** (0.048)	-0.054 (0.037)	0.058 (0.061)	(0.343)	2126	0.005 (0.036)	-0.033 (0.038)	0.033 (0.048)	(0.492)	1924
Financial inclusion	0.160* (0.083)	-0.108** (0.049)	0.049 (0.091)	(0.595)	2126	0.073 (0.050)	-0.110** (0.055)	0.024 (0.068)	(0.725)	1924
Human capital	0.068 (0.079)	-0.240*** (0.055)	0.003 (0.080)	(0.973)	2126	0.053 (0.061)	-0.260*** (0.064)	0.019 (0.079)	(0.806)	1924
<i>Secondary Outcomes</i>										
Coping mechanisms	-0.010 (0.074)	-0.003 (0.105)	0.025 (0.119)	(0.834)	467	0.117 (0.073)	0.151* (0.081)	-0.124 (0.096)	(0.196)	462
Social cohesion	0.014 (0.050)	-0.081* (0.047)	0.022 (0.063)	(0.725)	2126	0.042 (0.048)	-0.042 (0.048)	-0.013 (0.065)	(0.840)	1924
Civic engagement	0.159** (0.072)	-0.120** (0.056)	0.029 (0.068)	(0.676)	2126	-0.057 (0.045)	-0.164*** (0.051)	0.080 (0.062)	(0.198)	1924
Psychological well being	0.072** (0.035)	-0.100*** (0.033)	0.084** (0.039)	(0.035)	2125	-0.034 (0.028)	-0.054 (0.034)	0.033 (0.041)	(0.425)	1923
Women's empowerment and agency	0.100*** (0.035)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	(.)	1162	0.054* (0.030)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	(.)	1015
Panel B: Tunisia Round 2										
<i>Primary Outcomes</i>										
Labor market of the main respondent	0.000 (0.060)	-0.470*** (0.049)	0.034 (0.069)	(0.622)	1748	-0.021 (0.072)	-0.465*** (0.071)	0.016 (0.084)	(0.844)	1491
Labor market of the household	-0.035 (0.046)	-0.110*** (0.041)	0.002 (0.053)	(0.964)	1748	0.000 (0.052)	-0.093* (0.051)	-0.014 (0.061)	(0.825)	1491
Consumption expenditures	0.057 (0.066)	-0.123*** (0.038)	0.112 (0.068)	(0.103)	1748	-0.050 (0.045)	-0.079* (0.047)	0.071 (0.055)	(0.195)	1491
Assets owning	0.140*** (0.049)	0.000 (0.041)	0.016 (0.053)	(0.771)	1748	-0.021 (0.042)	-0.022 (0.043)	0.036 (0.052)	(0.487)	1491
Financial inclusion	-0.005 (0.059)	-0.110*** (0.038)	0.025 (0.057)	(0.661)	1748	0.104** (0.051)	0.060 (0.050)	-0.159** (0.064)	(0.013)	1491
Human capital	0.049 (0.049)	0.090 (0.062)	0.038 (0.089)	(0.672)	1748	0.060 (0.048)	0.148** (0.063)	-0.047 (0.077)	(0.539)	1491
<i>Secondary Outcomes</i>										
Coping mechanisms	0.049 (0.094)	-0.018 (0.083)	-0.068 (0.108)	(0.534)	438	0.095 (0.110)	0.013 (0.114)	-0.098 (0.129)	(0.445)	397
Social cohesion	0.042 (0.075)	0.010 (0.038)	-0.008 (0.055)	(0.885)	1748	-0.012 (0.072)	-0.057 (0.072)	0.062 (0.085)	(0.464)	1491
Civic engagement	0.028 (0.064)	-0.262*** (0.045)	0.116* (0.064)	(0.074)	1748	0.007 (0.061)	-0.189*** (0.061)	0.038 (0.072)	(0.597)	1491
Psychological well being	0.007 (0.035)	-0.080*** (0.028)	0.020 (0.034)	(0.564)	1748	-0.019 (0.033)	-0.078** (0.036)	0.015 (0.043)	(0.722)	1491
Women's empowerment and agency	-0.046 (0.049)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	(.)	1074	-0.027 (0.047)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	(.)	951
Antisocial behaviors	0.005 (0.017)	-0.015 (0.012)	-0.007 (0.017)	(0.702)	1748	0.033 (0.028)	-0.001 (0.032)	-0.049 (0.039)	(0.211)	1491
Prosocial behaviors	0.031 (0.080)	-0.063 (0.048)	-0.011 (0.073)	(0.878)	1748	0.127** (0.059)	0.013 (0.056)	-0.116 (0.075)	(0.123)	1491

Notes: This table reports heterogeneous effects with respect to the gender of the sampled individual (denoted "factor" in the table). We report the between-village comparison of eligible treated individuals vis-a-vis control village individuals; and the within-village comparison of eligible treated and untreated individuals. All specifications include strata fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the village level. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

TABLE A24: Heterogeneous effects with respect to local unemployment rate

	Between					Within				
	β	Factor	$\beta \times$ Factor	P-value	N	β	Factor	$\beta \times$ Factor	P-value	N
Panel A: Tunisia Round 1										
<i>Primary Outcomes</i>										
Labor market of the main respondent	0.198** (0.077)	0.110 (0.086)	-0.059 (0.112)	(0.599)	2126	-0.055 (0.048)	-0.041 (0.052)	0.081 (0.061)	(0.185)	1924
Labor market of the household	0.124** (0.054)	0.055 (0.060)	-0.018 (0.078)	(0.813)	2124	-0.060 (0.039)	-0.039 (0.043)	0.071 (0.050)	(0.151)	1921
Consumption	0.192*** (0.058)	0.153*** (0.047)	-0.195*** (0.071)	(0.007)	2126	0.029 (0.032)	-0.015 (0.033)	-0.021 (0.040)	(0.609)	1924
Assets	0.203*** (0.065)	0.111 (0.070)	-0.039 (0.100)	(0.700)	2126	-0.028 (0.039)	-0.017 (0.040)	0.085* (0.049)	(0.085)	1924
Financial inclusion	0.193* (0.103)	-0.009 (0.080)	-0.008 (0.129)	(0.953)	2126	0.151*** (0.049)	0.086 (0.054)	-0.124* (0.067)	(0.066)	1924
Human capital	0.128* (0.069)	0.131 (0.101)	-0.134 (0.120)	(0.268)	2126	0.083 (0.061)	0.050 (0.066)	-0.059 (0.081)	(0.466)	1924
<i>Secondary Outcomes</i>										
Coping mechanisms	0.026 (0.094)	-0.008 (0.093)	-0.032 (0.120)	(0.790)	467	0.072 (0.070)	0.001 (0.082)	-0.033 (0.097)	(0.734)	462
Social cohesion	0.022 (0.056)	0.011 (0.054)	0.005 (0.081)	(0.953)	2126	0.083* (0.049)	0.107** (0.050)	-0.086 (0.065)	(0.189)	1924
Civic engagement	0.226*** (0.083)	0.132 (0.096)	-0.122 (0.117)	(0.299)	2126	-0.024 (0.048)	0.012 (0.053)	0.002 (0.063)	(0.977)	1924
Psychological well being	0.066 (0.041)	-0.004 (0.043)	0.090* (0.054)	(0.100)	2125	-0.054 (0.033)	0.031 (0.035)	0.062 (0.042)	(0.147)	1923
Women's empowerment and agency	0.114** (0.049)	0.007 (0.039)	-0.026 (0.064)	(0.690)	1162	0.078* (0.042)	0.026 (0.050)	-0.042 (0.060)	(0.488)	1015
Panel B: Tunisia Round 2										
<i>Primary Outcomes</i>										
Labor market of the main respondent	-0.030 (0.061)	-0.042 (0.072)	0.030 (0.087)	(0.731)	1748	-0.037 (0.062)	-0.019 (0.069)	0.013 (0.081)	(0.870)	1491
Labor market of the household	-0.061 (0.042)	-0.034 (0.046)	0.039 (0.058)	(0.499)	1748	-0.033 (0.046)	-0.028 (0.049)	0.034 (0.058)	(0.560)	1491
Consumption expenditures	0.018 (0.073)	-0.086 (0.064)	0.196** (0.097)	(0.045)	1748	0.028 (0.035)	0.147*** (0.044)	-0.054 (0.051)	(0.286)	1491
Assets owning	0.129** (0.059)	0.024 (0.067)	0.031 (0.080)	(0.703)	1748	0.009 (0.039)	0.067 (0.042)	-0.010 (0.050)	(0.835)	1491
Financial inclusion	0.046 (0.046)	0.088* (0.050)	-0.099 (0.070)	(0.163)	1748	0.010 (0.046)	-0.007 (0.050)	-0.013 (0.062)	(0.836)	1491
Human capital	0.023 (0.076)	-0.077 (0.078)	0.120 (0.104)	(0.253)	1748	0.020 (0.066)	0.024 (0.071)	0.027 (0.085)	(0.748)	1491
<i>Secondary Outcomes</i>										
Coping mechanisms	0.050 (0.081)	0.093 (0.101)	-0.104 (0.123)	(0.403)	438	-0.023 (0.081)	-0.106 (0.098)	0.096 (0.114)	(0.400)	397
Social cohesion	0.058 (0.051)	0.183 (0.145)	-0.082 (0.160)	(0.611)	1748	-0.073 (0.067)	-0.052 (0.073)	0.170** (0.083)	(0.041)	1491
Civic engagement	0.038 (0.069)	-0.007 (0.070)	0.075 (0.100)	(0.456)	1748	0.014 (0.050)	0.047 (0.058)	0.021 (0.068)	(0.763)	1491
Psychological well being	-0.030 (0.049)	-0.085* (0.049)	0.096 (0.063)	(0.131)	1748	-0.006 (0.033)	0.024 (0.036)	-0.011 (0.042)	(0.789)	1491
Women's empowerment and agency	-0.040 (0.071)	-0.073 (0.079)	0.008 (0.102)	(0.935)	1074	0.039 (0.071)	0.045 (0.079)	-0.113 (0.094)	(0.228)	951
Antisocial behaviors	-0.010 (0.014)	-0.014 (0.012)	0.019 (0.017)	(0.282)	1748	-0.040 (0.043)	-0.059 (0.041)	0.070 (0.046)	(0.129)	1491
Prosocial behaviors	0.027 (0.064)	0.074 (0.068)	-0.033 (0.095)	(0.725)	1748	0.000 (0.057)	-0.042 (0.059)	0.090 (0.074)	(0.219)	1491

Notes: This table reports heterogeneous effects with respect to the local village-level unemployment rate as reported in the 2014 population census (denoted "factor" in the table). We report the between-village comparison of eligible treated individuals vis-a-vis control village individuals; and the within-village comparison of eligible treated and untreated individuals. All specifications include strata fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the village level. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10

TABLE A25: Heterogeneous effects with respect to local mean probability of economic shocks

	Between					Within				
	β	Factor	$\beta \times$ Factor	P-value	N	β	Factor	$\beta \times$ Factor	P-value	N
Panel A: Tunisia Round 1										
<i>Primary Outcomes</i>										
Labor market of the main respondent	0.181*** (0.065)	0.162* (0.093)	-0.072 (0.116)	(0.539)	2126	-0.086* (0.049)	-0.063 (0.052)	0.124** (0.062)	(0.046)	1924
Labor market of the household	0.110** (0.045)	0.121* (0.067)	-0.036 (0.084)	(0.670)	2124	-0.094** (0.041)	-0.050 (0.044)	0.121** (0.051)	(0.018)	1921
Consumption	0.141*** (0.052)	0.070 (0.056)	-0.091 (0.075)	(0.231)	2126	0.031 (0.029)	0.004 (0.032)	-0.023 (0.039)	(0.562)	1924
Assets	0.182** (0.075)	0.095 (0.072)	-0.018 (0.104)	(0.866)	2126	-0.048 (0.044)	-0.039 (0.043)	0.109** (0.052)	(0.037)	1924
Financial inclusion	0.134* (0.076)	0.020 (0.085)	0.074 (0.125)	(0.558)	2126	0.084 (0.053)	0.028 (0.056)	-0.008 (0.069)	(0.903)	1924
Human capital	0.039 (0.056)	0.068 (0.108)	0.019 (0.122)	(0.880)	2126	0.055 (0.061)	0.086 (0.065)	-0.010 (0.080)	(0.898)	1924
<i>Secondary Outcomes</i>										
Coping mechanisms	0.029 (0.083)	0.138 (0.089)	-0.059 (0.112)	(0.603)	467	0.013 (0.114)	0.038 (0.110)	0.046 (0.126)	(0.713)	462
Social cohesion	0.086 (0.060)	0.096* (0.051)	-0.133 (0.082)	(0.109)	2126	0.005 (0.041)	-0.059 (0.046)	0.043 (0.061)	(0.481)	1924
Civic engagement	0.225*** (0.080)	0.304*** (0.090)	-0.209* (0.113)	(0.069)	2126	-0.115** (0.053)	-0.057 (0.055)	0.146** (0.066)	(0.026)	1924
Psychological well being	0.123*** (0.040)	0.018 (0.041)	-0.015 (0.054)	(0.785)	2125	-0.021 (0.035)	0.004 (0.036)	0.003 (0.044)	(0.946)	1923
Women's empowerment and agency	0.064 (0.046)	0.041 (0.037)	0.037 (0.061)	(0.550)	1162	0.075** (0.036)	0.095** (0.044)	-0.029 (0.055)	(0.593)	1015
Panel B: Tunisia Round 2										
<i>Primary Outcomes</i>										
Labor market of the main respondent	-0.031 (0.062)	0.091 (0.072)	-0.022 (0.088)	(0.800)	1748	-0.022 (0.060)	0.079 (0.068)	-0.013 (0.080)	(0.870)	1491
Labor market of the household	-0.045 (0.041)	0.008 (0.048)	-0.001 (0.060)	(0.981)	1748	0.032 (0.043)	0.076 (0.047)	-0.072 (0.057)	(0.205)	1491
Consumption expenditures	0.043 (0.068)	0.039 (0.069)	0.099 (0.100)	(0.327)	1748	0.017 (0.034)	0.153*** (0.042)	-0.040 (0.050)	(0.416)	1491
Assets owning	0.114* (0.058)	0.013 (0.065)	0.050 (0.080)	(0.538)	1748	-0.015 (0.038)	0.032 (0.041)	0.024 (0.050)	(0.627)	1491
Financial inclusion	0.001 (0.053)	0.093* (0.050)	-0.040 (0.074)	(0.588)	1748	-0.007 (0.051)	0.041 (0.052)	0.016 (0.064)	(0.807)	1491
Human capital	-0.034 (0.070)	-0.096 (0.072)	0.219** (0.095)	(0.024)	1748	0.063 (0.047)	0.160*** (0.061)	-0.047 (0.076)	(0.538)	1491
<i>Secondary Outcomes</i>										
Coping mechanisms	0.050 (0.085)	0.181* (0.099)	-0.164 (0.123)	(0.187)	438	-0.036 (0.099)	-0.081 (0.103)	0.093 (0.121)	(0.443)	397
Social cohesion	0.088 (0.061)	0.110 (0.150)	-0.127 (0.172)	(0.462)	1748	0.018 (0.056)	-0.057 (0.063)	0.013 (0.077)	(0.866)	1491
Civic engagement	0.162** (0.072)	0.016 (0.070)	-0.132 (0.099)	(0.186)	1748	0.010 (0.059)	-0.150** (0.062)	0.025 (0.072)	(0.723)	1491
Psychological well being	0.054 (0.043)	0.012 (0.058)	-0.069 (0.068)	(0.320)	1748	-0.003 (0.036)	-0.036 (0.038)	-0.014 (0.044)	(0.744)	1491
Women's empowerment and agency	0.004 (0.076)	0.153* (0.078)	-0.151 (0.105)	(0.154)	1074	0.044 (0.079)	0.108 (0.083)	-0.106 (0.097)	(0.277)	951
Antisocial behaviors	-0.006 (0.010)	0.014 (0.017)	0.003 (0.020)	(0.899)	1748	0.013 (0.014)	0.040 (0.031)	-0.019 (0.034)	(0.565)	1491
Prosocial behaviors	-0.016 (0.052)	0.130* (0.069)	-0.005 (0.088)	(0.954)	1748	-0.040 (0.047)	-0.016 (0.058)	0.146** (0.069)	(0.033)	1491

Notes: This table reports heterogeneous effects with respect to the local prevalence of adverse shocks over the past year as reported in the first follow-up survey round conducted in 2016 (denoted "factor" in the table). We report the between-village comparison of eligible treated individuals vis-a-vis control village individuals; and the within-village comparison of eligible treated and untreated individuals. All specifications include strata fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the village level.

TABLE A26: Lee bounds for estimated treatment effects in round one

	Between						Spillovers						Within					
	lower	p-value	upper	p-value	N	N selected	lower	p-value	upper	p-value	N	N selected	lower	p-value	upper	p-value	N	N selected
Labor market of the main respondent	0.092*** (0.035)	0.009	0.353*** (0.027)	0.000	2541	2127	-0.199 (0.047)	0.524 (0.038)	0.070*** (0.038)	0.000	1723	1386	-0.199*** (0.034)	0.000	0.070** (0.035)	0.046	2536	1925
Labor market of the household	0.070** (0.028)	0.012	0.249*** (0.018)	0.000	2541	2125	-0.185 (0.038)	0.148 (0.029)	0.029*** (0.029)	0.000	1723	1385	-0.185*** (0.034)	0.000	0.029 (0.027)	0.290	2536	1922
Consumption expenditures	0.033 (0.021)	0.120	0.226*** (0.020)	0.000	2541	2127	-0.104* (0.027)	0.096 (0.023)	0.097*** (0.023)	0.000	1723	1386	-0.104*** (0.024)	0.000	0.097*** (0.024)	0.000	2536	1925
Assets owning	0.081*** (0.024)	0.001	0.311*** (0.023)	0.000	2541	2127	-0.123 (0.029)	0.553 (0.027)	0.142*** (0.027)	0.000	1723	1386	-0.123*** (0.031)	0.000	0.142*** (0.030)	0.000	2536	1925
Financial inclusion	0.088* (0.045)	0.053	0.349*** (0.042)	0.000	2541	2127	-0.116** (0.057)	0.020 (0.050)	0.178*** (0.050)	0.000	1723	1386	-0.116*** (0.038)	0.003	0.178*** (0.041)	0.000	2536	1925
Human capital	0.057 (0.038)	0.140	0.317*** (0.035)	0.000	2541	2127	-0.157 (0.046)	0.814 (0.049)	0.130*** (0.049)	0.000	1723	1386	-0.157*** (0.051)	0.002	0.130*** (0.045)	0.004	2536	1925
Coping mechanisms	-0.161** (0.066)	0.015	0.334*** (0.077)	0.000	2541	467	-0.436 (0.161)	0.450 (0.132)	0.287 (0.132)	0.892	1723	251	-0.436*** (0.088)	0.000	0.287*** (0.070)	0.000	2536	462
Social cohesion	-0.039 (0.025)	0.123	2.428*** (0.222)	0.000	2541	2127	-2.028* (0.028)	0.060 (0.230)	0.102*** (0.230)	0.000	1723	1386	-2.028*** (0.130)	0.000	0.102*** (0.031)	0.001	2536	1925
Civic engagement	0.000 (0.031)	0.995	0.308*** (0.032)	0.000	2541	2127	-0.188** (0.040)	0.031 (0.039)	0.138*** (0.039)	0.000	1723	1386	-0.188*** (0.038)	0.000	0.138*** (0.040)	0.001	2536	1925
Psychological well being	0.028 (0.020)	0.173	0.231*** (0.021)	0.000	2541	2126	-0.130 (0.026)	0.321 (0.026)	0.088*** (0.026)	0.000	1723	1386	-0.130*** (0.027)	0.000	0.088*** (0.026)	0.001	2536	1924

Notes: This table reports the results of bounds on the estimated treatment effects in the first follow-up survey conducted one year post-treatment, allowing for differential selection into the survey sample, constructed following Lee (2009). ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10

TABLE A27: Predictors of attrition between the first and second follow-up rounds

	Covariate	Treated	Interaction	N
Age	-0.002** (0.001)	0.040 (0.061)	0.000 (0.001)	2718
Female	-0.159*** (0.026)	0.116*** (0.029)	-0.161*** (0.033)	2718
Married	-0.101*** (0.025)	0.031 (0.030)	-0.006 (0.037)	2718
No education	-0.068*** (0.025)	0.043 (0.028)	-0.028 (0.030)	2718
Worked more than three months in 2013	0.026 (0.052)	0.012 (0.016)	0.144* (0.082)	2718
Born in the village	0.044 (0.027)	-0.043 (0.032)	0.077** (0.037)	2718
Born outside the governorate	-0.055* (0.029)	0.029 (0.019)	-0.047 (0.040)	2718

Notes: Each row reports the results of running a regression in which a binary indicator for attrition in the second follow-up survey round is regressed on the covariate of interest, the treatment indicator, and the interaction between covariate and treatment. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10

TABLE A28: Lee bounds for estimated treatment coefficients in round two

	Between						Spillovers						Within					
	lower	p-value	upper	p-value	N	N selected	lower	p-value	upper	p-value	N	N selected	lower	p-value	upper	p-value	N	N selected
Labor market of ain respondent	-0.077** (0.037)	0.036	0.167*** (0.045)	0.000	2126	1748	-0.165* (0.047)	0.059	0.640*** (0.049)	0.000	1386	1131	-0.165*** (0.063)	0.009	0.640*** (0.056)	0.000	1924	1491
Labor market of other household members	-0.077*** (0.026)	0.003	0.076*** (0.029)	0.010	2126	1748	-0.122*** (0.033)	0.009	0.006*** (0.041)	0.000	1386	1131	-0.122*** (0.039)	0.002	0.006 (0.030)	0.851	1924	1491
Consumption	0.052* (0.027)	0.053	0.221*** (0.025)	0.000	2126	1748	-0.096 (0.036)	0.362	0.033*** (0.033)	0.000	1386	1131	-0.096*** (0.037)	0.010	0.033 (0.031)	0.286	1924	1491
Assets	0.051** (0.025)	0.044	0.225*** (0.025)	0.000	2126	1748	-0.070 (0.031)	0.895	0.066*** (0.031)	0.000	1386	1131	-0.070** (0.033)	0.036	0.066** (0.032)	0.040	1924	1491
Financial inclusion	0.006 (0.027)	0.834	0.130*** (0.028)	0.000	2126	1748	-0.119 (0.035)	0.420	0.012*** (0.035)	0.000	1386	1131	-0.119*** (0.043)	0.005	0.012 (0.033)	0.716	1924	1491
Human capital	0.042 (0.040)	0.291	0.234*** (0.025)	0.000	2126	1748	-0.155 (0.050)	0.890	0.034*** (0.038)	0.000	1386	1131	-0.155* (0.083)	0.062	0.034 (0.042)	0.422	1924	1491
Coping mechanisms	-0.130* (0.075)	0.084	0.131 (0.085)	0.121	2126	438	-0.125 (0.117)	0.610	0.175 (0.162)	0.864	1386	253	-0.125 (0.083)	0.134	0.175* (0.095)	0.065	1924	397
Social cohesion	-0.085*** (0.030)	0.005	1.382*** (0.043)	0.000	2126	1748	-0.080*** (0.039)	0.008	2.380*** (0.058)	0.000	1386	1131	-0.080** (0.036)	0.025	2.380*** (0.315)	0.000	1924	1491
Civic engagement	-0.039 (0.035)	0.262	0.190*** (0.035)	0.000	2126	1748	-0.067*** (0.047)	0.008	0.093*** (0.041)	0.000	1386	1131	-0.067 (0.042)	0.116	0.093** (0.043)	0.032	1924	1491
Psychological well being	-0.120*** (0.041)	0.003	0.089** (0.038)	0.021	2126	1748	-0.100*** (0.051)	0.003	0.048*** (0.051)	0.000	1386	1131	-0.100** (0.045)	0.027	0.048 (0.051)	0.351	1924	1491
Women's empowerment and agency	-0.189*** (0.047)	0.000	-0.029 (0.043)	0.499	1174	1074	-0.051 (0.066)	0.206	-0.011 (0.053)	0.769	736	655	-0.051 (0.061)	0.405	-0.011 (0.049)	0.828	1026	951

Notes: This table reports the results of bounds on the estimated treatment effects in the second follow-up survey conducted five years post-treatment, allowing for differential attrition rates between the first and second surveys and constructed following Lee (2009). ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10